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We can't manage effectively without trust1 
 
Because environmental regulators exercise vast discretion against a background of scientific 
uncertainty, the background assumptions they use to guide their decisionmaking are particularly 
influential. This article suggests that were federal regulators to view themselves as human rights 
decisionmakers, we might well see a new kind of regulatory decisionmaking emerge—one not only more 
responsive and transparent but also more likely to enjoy the trust of the American public.  Drawing from 
the BP Oil Spill and the United States regulatory response to climate change this article shows how human 
rights norms might enrich domestic regulatory processes  and help environmental regulators implement 
their statutory mission of protecting the public welfare. It demonstrates how interpreting domestic legal 
obligations through the lens of human rights would enhance a commitment to participation, fairness and 
accountability, thereby making the domestic regulatory process not only better and fairer, but also more 
likely to be perceived as legitimate by the general public. The article concludes by pointing out some key 
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The United States has a regulatory system in dire need of reform. Beset by failures 
like oil well blowouts,
2
 coal mine explosions,
3





 and the bungled response to Hurricane Katrina,
6
 the federal 
regulatory apparatus has foundered; indeed some call it broken.
7
 Blatant manipulation of 
the science behind climate change and other policy creates a sense that regulation is just a 
political game.
8
 As a result, the regulatory state has lost the trust of the American people. 
Indeed, in April 2010, the Pew Research Center reported that only 22% of Americans 
                                                 
2
 The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Oil Spill issued its final report in January 2011. The 
report can be found at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ Many of the key documents associated with the 
BP oil spill can be found on the Deepwater Horizon Unified Command website at 
http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/site/2931/.  For a report detailing the regulatory failure 
aspects of the disaster, see Alyson Flournoy, et al., Regulatory Blowout: How Regulatory Failures Made 
the BP Blowout Possible and How the System Can Be Fixed to Avoid a Recurrence (Oct. 2010) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm?RequestTimeout=50000000.  
3
 See Howard Berkes, FBI Probes Massey Energy, Regulators in Mine Blast, NPR (April 30, 2010) 
http://www.scpr.org/news/2010/04/30/fbi-probes-massey-energy-regulators-in-mine-blast/; See e.g., Ian 
Urbina and Michael Cooper Deaths at West Virginia Mine Raise Issues About Safety, NEW YORK TIMES 
(April 6, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/us/07westvirginia.html;. 
4
 For example, in its reporting about the tainted cough syrup that killed hundreds in Panama, the New York Times 
described ―a tainted pipeline stretching half-way around the world.‖ Walt Bogdanich and Jake Hooker, From China to 
Panama, a Trail of Poisoned Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007) (tracing the diethylene glycol tainted syrup from 
China, through Europe to Panama.) 
5
 See e.g., David Leonhart, Lessons from a Crisis: When Trust Vanishes, Worry, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Sept. 30 2008); Sarah Knapton, Financial Crisis: Home Safe Sales Soar as Trust in Banks Collapses, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 2008); Theresa Tedesco, Trust in Short Supply During Financial Crisis, FINANCIAL 
POST (Sept. 17, 2008). 
6
 Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster of immense proportions but the failures to anticipate, prepare 
for, and respond to the hurricane were regulatory failures. From certifying inadequate levies, to permitting 
wholesale destruction of wetlands to shortchanging emergency response planning, all of the regulatory 
agencies tasked with protecting New Orleans did not live up to their statutory obligations. For a collection 
of various writings making this point, see Center for Progressive Reform, Katrina: An Unnatural Disaster 
Years in the Making, http://www.progressivereform.org/katrina.cfm. 
7
 For a full development of this argument, see generally RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE 
PEOPLES AGENT AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTEREST, GOVERNMENT 
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010)   
8
MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE: INSIDE THE POLITICAL ATTACK ON DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE 
TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING (2007); For a thorough exploration of this problem, see RESCUING SCIENCE 
FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 24–45, 61–85 (Rena Steinzor 
& Wendy Wagner, eds. 2007)(documenting the ways that interest groups distort science to support political 
positions.); see also CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 102–20 (2006). Allegations 
swirled for years that political appointees in the Bush administration heavily edited scientific testimony and 
government publications concerning climate change. In 2007, a House Committee Investigation concluded 
that the administration systematically manipulated climate change science to minimize the dangers of 
global warming. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Political Interference with Climate 
Change Science Under the Bush Administration 16–32 (December 2007), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071210101633.pdf. Among the study‘s conclusions, political 
appointees edited agency reports ―to exaggerate or emphasize scientific uncertainties or to deemphasize or 
diminish the importance of the human role in global warming.‖ Id. at ii.  In his inaugural address, President 





trust the federal government all or most of the time – among the lowest levels in the past 
fifty years.
 9
 Rebuilding that trust will require a significant governmental commitment to 
transforming ―business as usual‖ and to renewing the link between regulation and the 
public purposes regulation is intended to serve.   
One way we might begin is by transforming the regulatory perspective—those 
background assumptions that regulators use to guide their decisionmaking. These 
assumptions play a particularly important role in contexts like environmental regulation, 
where discretion is vast and scientific certainties are few.
10
 Were federal regulators to 
embrace human rights norms, and view themselves as making decisions with human 
rights ramifications, we might well see a new kind of regulatory decisionmaking 
emerge—one more likely to garner the trust of a suspicious and distrusting public. This 
article makes the case for such a transformation, arguing that regulators should draw on 
human rights norms to help them grapple more effectively with issues of fairness and 
transparency.
11
 Indeed, embrace of emerging human rights norms around participation, 
access to information, transparency, and intergenerational equity, can help regulators 
exercise their discretion in a fashion that not only supports rather than undermines 
regulatory legitimacy, but also leads to better, more sustainable decisionmaking.  
This observation remains true despite intense disagreement about whether 
emerging international norms have coalesced into a free-standing environmental right 
cognizable under international human rights law.
12
 The very characteristics that are 
advanced as undermining the validity of the claim to a free-standing human right to a 
wholesome environment actually offer support for the notion of incorporating human 
                                                 
9
 See Pew Research Center, Distrust, Discontent, Anger Partisan Rancor: the People and their 
Government (March 2010) http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1569/trust-in-government-distrust-discontent-
anger-partisan-rancor (hereafter Pew Report); Liz Halloran, Pew Poll: Trust in Government Hits Near 
Historic Lows NPR (April 18, 2010) http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126047343. 
While anti-government rhetoric surrounding the health care debate is likely to blame for some of the 
decrease, it is clear that there are serious trust problems that extend beyond the Tea Party fringe. For 
example, trust in EPA and FDA decreased by 15% and 17% respectively over the past decade, though both 
agencies still held the trust of a slight majority of the American public. Seventy-four percent thought the 
federal government did a fair or poor job of running its programs.   
10
 For recognition of this point in the context of the Clean Air Act, see Lead Industries Ass‘n, Inc. v. 
EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1147 (D. C. Cir. 1980) (noting the wide policy discretion agencies have when making 
decisions ―at the frontiers of science.‖) 
11
 For a detailed analysis of these stages of the regulatory process, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan 
Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions in the Shadow of the State, in THE 
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION (Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds. 2009). While human rights 
norms might be of value to regulators across all aspects of regulation: from agenda-setting through 
negotiation and implementation to enforcement, this project focuses on the more general question of 
whether international human rights norms are an appropriate source for regulators to draw on in order to 
improve domestic environmental regulatory process, leaving for later work the specifics of how human 
rights might be used to transform each specific stage of the regulatory process. 
12
 See e.g., RICHARD P. HISKES, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO A GREEN FUTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
AND INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 36-47 (2010)(summarizing the philosophical debate); Gunther Handl, 
Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View 117, 121 in HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992) (cautioning against misrepresenting 
aspirational environmental human rights concepts as hard law, and recommending avoiding ―talismanic 





rights norms into the domestic regulatory decisionmaking process. If environmental 
decisions are in fact a constant trade-off between competing priorities, regulators need 
guideposts for exercising their discretion as they make decisions about these trade-offs.  
Emerging international norms associated with the putative right to a healthy environment 
focus on facilitating participation and providing meaningful information.  Embracing 
these norms will help regulators keep the big picture in mind and might provide a 
welcome counterweight to deregulatory pressures stemming from free-market ideology. 
As such, incorporating these international human rights norms into the fabric of 
discretionary decisionmaking can help regulators resist the pressures of momentary 
expediency, by putting a thumb on the scale for overall system legitimacy and integrity.    
Using human rights norms in this fashion begins with recognizing regulators as 
potential human rights decisionmakers. Once regulators view themselves in this light, the 
potential utility of international human rights discourse in domestic regulatory processes 
becomes clear. Lessons gleaned from the field of human rights can enrich domestic 
regulation by making the decisionmaking process more responsive, more transparent, and 
ultimately more likely to enjoy the trust of the American public. This argument is both 
prudential and normative—making the case that resort to environmental human rights 
norms is a good idea because these concepts can help regulators implement their statutory 




Part I begins with a description of the regulatory enterprise—highlighting the need to 
make regulatory decisions under conditions of uncertainty and despite critical knowledge 
gaps.  This section suggests that it is these aspects of regulatory decisionmaking that 
make it ripe for lessons from human rights.  Part II offers a brief overview of 
international human rights law, and then provides an introduction to the emerging norms 
often associated with a putative human right to a healthy environment. Part III introduces 
the domestic environmental law questions that would most benefit if regulators borrowed 
from human rights. This section highlights some key deficiencies in current practices that 
borrowing from human rights might address. This section draws from the BP Oil Spill 
and the United States regulatory response to climate change to show how domestic 
regulatory processes might be enriched by international human rights norms. It 
demonstrates how interpreting domestic legal obligations through the lens of human 
rights would enhance a commitment to participation, fairness and accountability, thereby 
making the domestic regulatory process not only better and fairer, but also more likely to 
be perceived as legitimate by the general public. Finally, the article concludes by pointing 
out some key limitations of the human rights approach for achieving environmental ends 
and proposes some concrete steps to expand environmental rights beyond human rights.  
 
                                                 
13
 For a discussion of borrowing in the constitutional context, see Nelson Tebbe & Richard Tsai, 
Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459 2010 (defining constitutional borrowing as ―the practice 
of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into 
another for persuasive ends.‖ I use the term borrowing in much the same way, but in the regulatory rather 




I. THE REGULATOR AS POTENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONMAKER 
 
Federal agencies  -make a wide range of discretionary decisions.  For most of these 
decisions, there will be virtually no oversight: no court, legislature or public-minded 
group will challenge, or even closely examine, the agency‘s fidelity to its statutory 
mandate and/or the public‘s interest. The Supreme Court‘s Chevron decision,
14
 whic 
severely limiting judicial oversight, only magnified this already existing phenomenon. 
Public Choice theory suggests that, under these circumstances, agencies will inevitably 
become rent-seekers, rather than public watchdogs, enforcers or investigators.  
Public choice scholars
15
 have given particular attention to regulation in the 
environmental context. The public choice theory has at its heart the conviction that 
legislation (and by corollary regulation) is a good to be sold in the marketplace to the 
highest bidder.
16
 Thus, the public choice narrative posits that concentrated, economically 
powerful industries with significant economic stakes in regulatory decisions will win out 
against diffuse, public interests. Yet environmental law, which often benefits diffuse and 
relatively non-economic public interests at the expense of concentrated economic 
interests stands as something of a paradox for public choice theory.  Responses to this 
critique, ranging from the republican moment theory of legislation and regulation
17
 to 
Habermasean deliberative democracy, reflect extremely varied first assumptions about 
how and why human beings structure themselves into societies and groups. Regardless of 
which camp one inhabits, it is clear that this theoretical dialogue taps into something 
fundamental in environmental law—the multiple, often conflicting goals that surround 
environmental choices, and the power inequality inherent to so many regulatory 
dynamics between regulated communities and the public beneficiaries of environmental 
regulation. Recognizing this essentially contested nature of environmental 
decisionmaking, and the enormous power differentials between the subjects and 
beneficiaries of regulation, also means acknowledging the high stakes that surround many 
exercises of regulatory discretion. With the potentially immense social impacts flowing 
from these discretionary decisions in plain view, the quest to embed exercises of 
regulatory discretion within a value system takes on added urgency. Efficiency and 
market rationality offer one such structure, while human rights provides an alternative 
organizing principle, emphasizing a different set of social values. Indeed, human rights 
might be a tool for channeling regulatory discretion toward paths more likely to 
maximize overall social benefit, and away from paths giving undue weight to narrow, 
albeit powerful, special interests.  
The inquiry into the human rights agency of environmental regulators is of particular 
                                                 
14
 Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)  
15
 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 5-65 (1971) 
16
 For summaries of these public choice analyses, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND THE 
PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 15, 19-21 (2008); Daniel A. 
Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 61, 65 (1992).  For a 
thorough analysis of environmental federalism through a public choice lens, see Richard L Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 636-41 
(2001). 
17
 Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment- Explanations for 




importance in the United States because the United States does not currently recognize 
any constitutional environmental rights.
18
 Thus, any arguments for recognition and 
implementation of substantive environmental rights must either derive those 
environmental rights from statutory enactments, state constitutional rights to a healthy 
environment,
19
 or existing federal constitutional rights.
20
  
When legislating in the environmental area, Congress has been prone to grand 
statements and sweeping language.
21
 Profound underlying questions about the relative 
weight of competing priorities and the proper role for agencies vis-à-vis the public they 
serve are typically left unanswered by broad-brush statutory enactments. Their resolution 
is delegated to the discretion of regulatory agencies which are tasked with transforming 
lofty legislative pronouncements into a functional regulatory program. In shaping the 
contours of the regulatory scheme, agencies must balance competing objectives, make 
choices about priorities, simplify and standardize, and generally exercise a great deal of 
                                                 
18
 Often constitutionalization is interpreted to be a key signal that a state has accepted the validity of 
human rights norms. The first meaningful attempt to enshrine environmental rights in the United States 
constitution came in 1968 when Wisconsin Senator Gaylord Nelson proposed a constitutional amendment 
which read: ―Every person has the inalienable right to a decent environment. The United States and every 
state shall guarantee this right.‖ Carole L. Gallagher, The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of 
Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107, 120 citing H.R.J. Res. 1321, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). This and similar subsequent attempts to include environmental rights in the 
United States constitution failed, though Senator Nelson‘s proposed amendment certainly did much to raise 
awareness about then-looming environmental issues. Id. at 120, citing H.R.J. Res. 1205, 91st Cong. (1970) 
19
 For a description of constitutional environmental rights, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, On 
Constitutionalizing Environmental Rights 209, 211-13, in LAW AND RIGHTS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GOVERNANCE (Penelope A. Andrews & Susan Bazilli, eds. 2008). While these 
constitutional rights are important, by themselves they do not vitiate the need for a human rights approach 
to environmental regulation. As is true with most constitutional environmental rights around the world 
however, these state-guaranteed environmental rights are typically formulated in open-ended language, 
seeking consensus on an abstraction without actually resolving the complicated moral and political 
questions implicated by environmental rights.  Some formulations are wholly aspirational, while others can 
offer a normative hook for courts and regulators seeking to ‗green‘ interpretations of domestic law. See 
e.g., Jona Razzaque, Human Rights and the Environment: the National Experience of South Asia and 
Africa, Joint UNEP-OHCRC Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment: Background Paper 
No. 4, 14-16 (2002). See also Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 
FORDHAM ENVT‘L L. REV. 471 (2007). While the same criticisms have been leveled at human rights, there 
is a growing body of law and scholarship focused on pinning down the content of rights like participation, 
transparency and equity. Given the overlap between constitutional environmental rights, statutory rights, 
and human rights norms surrounding the environment, an appreciation for those human rights might help 
law makers and regulators operationalize those constitutional and statutory environmental commitments. 
See e.g., Hannah Hurst, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law, 25 Ga. J. Comp. & Int‘l L. 287 (1996)(providing a survey of the varying way that 
national courts have deployed international human rights); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International 
Law in Constitutional Interpretation,  98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 82, 85 (2004) (making the point that human rights 
call into question positive law that is insufficiently respectful of internationally-articulated values.) 
20
 Some argue that international law directly creates environmental rights that states are bound to 
implement. In order to focus on the more modest claim that international human rights norms can usefully 
inform regulators seeking to implement rights grounded elsewhere, this article brackets that argument.   
21
 For example, the Clean Water Act identified eliminating the discharge of pollutants into waters of 
the United States as a goal to be met by 1985. Clean Water Act §101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §1251. The National 
Environmental Policy Act announces a national policy of using all practicable means ―to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,‖ NEPA § 101(a), 42. 




discretion.  Unless this exercise of discretion runs counter to an explicit statutory 
command or is otherwise arbitrary and capricious, courts are reluctant to interfere with 
the balance that is struck.
22
  How agencies exercise their discretion is thus the single most 
important factor in determining whether environmental statutes produce an equitable 
distribution of environmental risks and benefits across society, and whether the statutes 
succeed in achieving their environmental objectives. At the regulatory level, 
decisionmakers are grappling with some of the precise moral and political questions that 
international human rights law has developed to address. 
Yet, human rights lawyers have so far rarely waded into these waters, instead 
focusing their creative thinking about law and legal arguments on the context of 
litigation, courts and judges. As a result we have seen human rights arguments 
increasingly being used as new or supplemental rationales for judicial decisions.
23
 With 
all due respect for that strategy, there are many other legal venues besides the courtroom 
in which human rights ideas might make a difference.  As Professors McDougal and 
Lasswell memorably pointed out,
24
 there are other legal decisionmakers besides judges, 
and other ways to influence authoritative decision besides litigation.
25
 Their concept of 
                                                 
22
 Saying this does not mean that courts fail to police the processes by which agencies strike that 
balance.  Under the ―hard look‖ doctrine, for example, courts carefully examine the rulemaking process to 
ensure that proper procedures have been followed and that statutorily-mandated factors have been 
considered. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
463 U.S. 27 (1983). However, outside of satisfying themselves that agencies have considered statutorily-
identified factors and employed appropriate procedures, judicial review of the actual regulatory choices 
made through an exercise of regulatory discretion is extremely limited. See Administrative Procedures Act 
§706.    
23
 For example, human rights arguments featured prominently in successful petitions to the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 573-78 (2003) (referencing decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights); Ropers v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (pointing out that the court‘s decision was 
in line with the ―overwhelming weight‖ of ―virtually unanimous‖ international opinion); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (relying in part on European decisions to conclude that executing the 
mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment).  The failure of human rights arguments in Castlerock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) prompted a new lawsuit before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. Gonzales v. United States, All legal documents relating to this case can be found at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/InterAmer/GonzalesvUS/CaseDocs. For a 
discussion of the import of the Inter-American Commission‘s 2007 ruling that it had jurisdiction to hear the 
case, see ACLU, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Holds US Responsible for Protecting 
Domestic Violence Victims (Oct. 7, 2007) http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/inter-american-commission-
human-rights-holds-us-responsible-protecting-domestic-violen. Nothing in this article is intended to 
denigrate this use of international human rights principles.  Instead, the argument is that there is much more 
that might be done to use those principles to transform domestic law in the United States. For an excellent 
exploration of the myriad ways that human rights might be used in the United States, see BRINGING HUMAN 
RIGHTS HOME (Cindy Soohoo, Cathy Albisa & Martha F. Davis, eds. 2008). 
24
 See generally, HAROLD. D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE 
SOCIETY (1992) (exploring the question of authoritative decisionmaking in exhaustive, and sometimes 
excruciating detail); see also Rebecca M. Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Law: A 
Process-Oriented Approach to Sustainable Development, 32 YALE J. INT‘L L. 363, 370–77 (2007) 
25
 See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ix (1960). Much of the 
scholarship associated with the New Haven School that McDougal and Laswell founded has been criticized 
as opaque and inpenetrable.  See e.g., Rebecca Bratspies, Rethinking Decisionmaking in International Law: 
A Process-Oriented Approach to Sustainable Development, 32 Yale J. Int‘l L. 363, 390 (2007); Spencer 
Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. 






 which Michael Reisman explained as a process of 
communication involving "policy content, authority signal and control intention,‖
27
 offers 
a more nuanced way to think about the relationship between law, policy and society.  
For example, each day regulators make an uncounted number of discretionary 
decisions with legal effect. Taken together, these decisions influence nearly every aspect 
of our lives. Yet, there is rarely much attention paid to the possibility of considering these 
regulatory decisionmaking processes as a means to advance core human rights values. . 
This article proposes to change that by using international human rights norms to flesh 
out the regulatory processes already present in United States administrative law, albeit in 
nascent form, that locate human rights and human dignity squarely in the center of the 
regulatory enterprise.  
This point differs slightly from Ann-Marie Slaughter‘s insights about the roles played 
by transnational networks.
28
 Rather than focusing on linkages between regulators across 
jurisdictions that can be used to develop consensus approaches to regulation, this article 
instead emphasizes the agency of regulators as authoritative human rights 
decisionmakers. Thus, the focus is more on ―bringing human rights home‖
29
 than on 
processes for voluntarily coordinating national environmental policies across the globe. 
That said, the extensive transnational network discourse informs this analysis of how 
regulators might fruitfully incorporate human rights into regulatory decisionmaking in 
order to enrich and improve the domestic regulatory process. In particular, this analysis 
seeks to remedy the human rights community‘s tendency to neglect the wider panoply of 
legal decisionmakers as potentially receptive audiences with the power to implement 
human rights norms in their decisionmaking processes. Human rights norms surrounding 
access to information and participation might be particularly useful in this context. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Studies, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 811, 818-20 (1990); Oran R. Young, International Law and Social Science: The 
Contributions of Myres S. McDougal, 66 Am. J. Int‘l. L. 60, 72-76 (1972); See also John N. Moore, 
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 Va. L. Rev. 662, 665 
(1968); Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law—Gaps in Legal 
Thinking, 50 Va. L. Rev. 231, 234-35 (1964). Nevertheless, the core ideas of the ―authoritative 
decisionmaker‖ with the power to advance ―human dignity‖ may be of value in any attempt to expand the 
reach of human rights norms beyond the courtroom into administrative decisionmaking. See HAROLD D. 
LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 
& W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF 
THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN 
DIGNITY (1980); and Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law on National Law: A Policy-
Oriented Perspective, 4 S. D. L. REV. 25 (1959). 
26
 Authoritative decisionmaking is a central concept in New Haven School theories. It represents the 
synthesis of effective control with a legitimated process comporting with the ―shared expectations of the 
members of a community about how decisions should be taken.‖ Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell 
& W. Michael Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 
VA. J. INT‘L L. 188, 195, n. 15 (1968). 
27
 W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L 
L. PROC. 101, 113 (1981). 
28
 ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 167-69 (2004).  See also Kal Raustiala, The 
Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International 
Law, 43 Va. J. Int‘l L. (2002); David T. Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law (2008) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156930.   
29
 For an explanation of this idea, see generally, CATHY ALBISA, CINDY SOOHOO & MARTHA DAVIS, 




Learning from human rights developments in these areas might dramatically improve the 
regulatory process, providing regulators with new tools for generating broad-based 
participation. Having all the values and interests at stake in environmental protection 
decisions adequately represented in the decisionmaking process will enhance the 
legitimacy and long-term success of the regulatory project. In other words, human rights 
norms might offer ―authoritative decisionmakers‖ a tool for re-interpreting their existing 
environmental mandates in a fashion that will not only improve the regulatory decisions 
themselves, but will also help those decisions command more trust and respect from the 
regulated community and the public beneficiaries of regulation.  
Having identified regulators as authoritative decisionmakers whose decisions have 
potential human rights implications, we now now turn to international human rights law 
in order to examine its utility within the domestic regulatory context. The next section 
will first distinguish this proposed regulatory incorporation of human rights from existing 
invocations of human rights law in the environmental context. It will then delve into the 
specific aspects of international human rights law of most interest in the domestic 
regulatory context.  
 
II. WHAT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CAN OFFER UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
 To date, the primary avenue by which international environmental norms 
emerging from human rights theory have entered the United States legal discourse has 
been through Alien Tort Claims Act
30
 suits alleging that environmental wrongs violated 
the law of nations. The thrust of the argument has therefore been focused on whether 
there is a human right to a healthy environment. United States domestic courts have so-
far resisted the invitation to find such a right, under either international human rights
31
 or 
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 The Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350, enacted in 1789, creates federal  district court 
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(affirming dismissal of ATCA environmental claim on the ground that the human rights to life, health and 
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F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing environmental alien tort claim suit on political question 
doctrine grounds); Beanal v. Freeport-McMorran, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. La. 1997)(finding that 
environmental tort allegations did not allege a violation of a ―universal, definable and obligatory‖ 
international norm); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Principle 2 
of the Rio Declaration might constitute a  binding international environmental norm but dismissing the case 
on forum non conveniens grounds); Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp. 775 F. Supp. 668. 671(1991)(finding that 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration did not constitute a binding international norm). But see, Oposa 
v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792, 804-805 (1993 (refusing to dismiss environmental claims under political 
question doctrine and recognizing a justiciable ―right to a balanced and healthful ecology.‖) Séverine 
Fiorletta Leroy, Can the Human Rights Bodies be Used to Produce Interim Measures to Protect 




in domestic constitutional rights,
32
 often concluding instead that the legislative and 
executive branches of government are better suited to establish environmental rights. A 
primary objection to the notion of recognizing independent environmental human rights 
is that ―the evolution of environmental protection measures has involved a constant 
reordering of socio-economic priorities, of accommodating, adjusting or offsetting 
mutually restrictive if not exclusive public policy objectives.‖
33
  Among the major 
sticking points is the question of who would hold such a right
34
 and whether the right 
would have to account for future generations and group rights.
35
  In an ever-more 
integrated, globalized world, how would the right to a healthy environment be enforced 
and would the right have any limits?
36
  
These are certainly important and interesting questions.  However, there are other 
questions about these international law principles worth asking under United States 
domestic law.  For example, as EPA uses its authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions how should the agency confront questions of equity and 
                                                                                                                                                 
appropriate forum to protect human rights.) 
32
 Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly declined the invitation to interpret existing constitutional 
language as including environmental rights. See e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429 (9th 
Cir.1989) (declining to find a fundamental constitutional right to a wholesome environment within the 
equal protection clause of the 14
th
 amendment); Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 
(D.C.Cir. 1981) (declaring that generalized environmental concerns do not constitute a constitutionally 
protected liberty or property interest); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4
th
 Cir. 1971) (same). In the early 
1970‘s, a string of district court cases fleshed out this position, most notably Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium 
and Exposition District, 418 F.Supp. 716 (E.D.La.1976) (stating that the courts have never seriously 





amendments); Haggadorn v. Union Carbide, 363 F.Supp. 1061 (D. W. Va., 1973); Tanner v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.Tex. 1972) ("The Ninth Amendment, through its 'penumbra' or 
otherwise, embodies no legally assertable right to a healthful environment."); and Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. 
Corps of Eng'rs of U.S. Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (D.C. Ark. 1970) (holding that there is no 
Constitutional right to a healthy environment under the 5th, 9th or 14th Amendments), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). For a discussion of these cases, see Carole L. Gallagher, 
The Movement to Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 
Fordham Envtl. L.J. 107, 112-17 (1997).   
33
 Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View 117, 
121 in HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (A. Cançado Trindade ed.) (1992) 
34
 It is possible to make too much of this claim. See John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights, 
50 Va. J. Int‘l L. 163, 171 (2009)(making the point that many human rights agreements have been 
interpreted to require that states not only avoid directly violating the rights involved but also protect the 
enumerated rights from private conduct that interferes with their enjoyment.)   
35
 Alan Boyle, Human Rights or Environmental Rights? A Reassessment, 18 FORDHAM ENVT‘L L. REV. 
471 (2007) (raising these questions). 
36
 The recognition of a human right does not mean that any interference with that right by any actor, 
anywhere in the world violates a legal duty.  See Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human Rights, 32 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 321 (2004); John Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT‘L L. 27-28 
(2008). Indeed, the provision in Article 2 of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights for ―progressive realization‖ is an acknowledgment that full realization of these rights sometimes 
involves commitments beyond the immediate capacity of states. This critique about the contours of human 
rights is separate and apart from the more fundamental objection that an overemphasis on rights may 
actually interfere with social change by obscuring recognition of social duties and fragmenting 





justice, and how should it account for transnational impacts of climate change—all 
questions to which international human rights norms already speak.
37
    
   Unfortunately, discouraged by this ―no‖ to the question of whether there is an 
already-recognized human right to a healthy environment, many human rights 
campaigners abandon law in favor of the political process.  Those still committed to law 
as a vehicle for achieving human rights typically redouble their efforts with the courts.
38
 
Yet, there is another, often-overlooked avenue to incorporating human rights into 
domestic policy. Human rights norms can provide regulators with a normative framework 
for structuring and interpreting their regulatory discretion.
39
 Because environmental 
human rights norms typically prioritize transparency, responsiveness and accountability, 
they can help regulators engage in environmental decisionmaking that enhances rather 
than undermines public trust in environmental regulation.
40
 In many ways, the 
international environmental human rights norms have developed in parallel to United 
States domestic law, grappling with many of the same perplexing questions about how to 
balance competing priorities, what to do about uncertainty, and what levels of 
transparency and participation are critical for overall regime legitimacy and fundamental 
fairness. Just as international law has been influenced by innovations in United States 
law, regulatory interpretation of domestic law can be informed by concepts developed 
internationally. 
Under such an approach, each environmental decisionmaking point becomes an 
opportunity for realizing a human rights vision under domestic law because each such 
decision involves exercises of discretion by government actors. That regulatory discretion 
would be shaped and channeled differently were it informed by a human rights vision of 
environmental protection.    
   The rest of this section lays the groundwork for this claim about the utility of 
human rights norms in domestic regulatory decisionmaking. The first part provides an 
overview of the critical normative role human rights plays in international law and 
society. With that background, the second part examines the history of environmental 
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 Of course, there is also the question of whether an analytical framework that developed in response 
to active and direct government abuses offers the right tools for responding to the ravages of climate 
change, which is primarily the result of private economic activity. While government policies obviously 
facilitate and channel the private economic activity through exercise of governmental licensing, taxation 
and police powers, there is at least arguably a difference between these regulatory activities and the kinds 
of direct government activities that human rights law has typically addressed. 
38
 Many of the instances in which there is the most pressure for invoking human rights discourse 
involve the environmental rights of indigenous peoples. Given the tenuous historical relationship between 
indigenous groups and international law, and the ambiguities of group rights as human rights, the Draft 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights notwithstanding, it is difficult not to notice the irony of this use of human 
rights principles. 
39
 Joseph Raz has persuasively argued that when we state that ‗X‘ has a right, we are asserting that ‗X‘ 
has interests which are sufficiently weighty to impose obligations on others. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY 
OF FREEDOM 166 (1986). Even without establishing specific environmental rights, domestic environmental 
law clearly follows this Razian formula--imposing obligations in order to protect the weighty 
environmental and health interests of both society as a whole, and of its individual members.  This 
parallelism between recognized interests and imposed obligations, suggests that the ideas and concepts 
fleshed out in the human rights context about environmental decisionmaking may provide useful models 
for fleshing out the contours of the obligations under domestic environmental law.   
40
 For a discussion of what it takes to establish ―regulatory trust‖, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, 




rights under international and supra-national law, focusing on the relationship between 
environmental claims and human rights. Finally, the third part introduces three emerging 
norms that are closely associated with human rights in the environmental context: prior 
informed consent, transparency and participation. This section not only explains each 
norm, but also highlights the aspects most likely to be of use to domestic regulators.  
 
A.  An Introduction to International Human Rights   
 
The idea of human rights—inalienable, universal rights to which all are entitled 
simply by virtue of being human
41
—stands out as a significant achievement of twentieth-
century legal thought.  While the intellectual history behind human rights certainly traces 
its roots back to the Enlightenment,
42
 the specific principles we think of as human rights 
emerged from the more immediate and bloody context of Nazi genocide in the early 
decades of the twentieth-century.
43
 Since the acceptance of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948,
44
 the concepts of human rights have increasingly been accepted 
as the governing norms for state behavior.
45
 Unsurprisingly in light of its moment of 
birth, the Universal Declaration responds to the central international legal challenge of 
the twentieth century—the proper limits of state power vis-à-vis individuals who are 
members of marginalized racial, ethnic or religious minorities.  As such, international 
human rights law deals mainly with how people should be treated by government and its 
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 For a discussion on this point, see Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights,  27 J. LAND 
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26-30 (2009); TOM CAMPBELL, RIGHTS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 5-10 (2006). 
43
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Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) 
45
 Indeed, compliance with human rights norms is often the major criteria for categorizing states as 
―liberal‖ and therefore legitimate. See e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 84-104 
(William Rehg, trans. 1998); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); 
Ann-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6  Eur. J. Int‘l L. 139 (1995); see 
also Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into 
Domestic Practices 1, 18-22, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC 
CHANGE (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds 1999) (describing the embrace of 
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 The International Human Rights Covenants
47
 and the proliferation of rights 
treaties that followed
48
 further detail the scope and reach of human rights described in the 
Universal Declaration.  
Although we are only one decade into the new century, it is already clear that the 
widespread adoption of international human rights treaties did not draw a line under 
incidents violating basic human rights.  Abuses continue, and neither the Universal 
Declaration, nor the Genocide convention
49
 nor the International Criminal Court,
50
 have 
put an end to them.
51
  Not only have human rights not eliminated rights-violating conduct 
by states, but the growing proliferation of non-state actors raises a whole new set of 
challenges that a state-based vision of human rights is hard pressed to address.  Profound 
questions remain about the utility of relying on international human rights to respond to 
abuses committed by non-state actors, particularly multinational corporations.
52
   
Even as old human rights problems linger, the new century (and millennium) brings 
new challenges. In particular, environmental problems confront us ever more acutely.  
Each day brings new evidence that human activity is dramatically and irreversibly 
altering the entire planet: unraveling the life support systems on which we and all other 
living creatures depend. The defining moral issue and social justice challenge of the 
twenty-first century may well be the tragic effects of climate change, just as genocide and 
the struggle against oppression of stigmatized groups was the defining challenge of the 
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 See generally, Thomas Pogge, The International Significance of Human Rights," 4 J. OF ETHICS 45, 
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OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2009) 
47
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44; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted March 7, 
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.  
49
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S 
277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). For updates, see The Campaign to End Genocide, 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/.  
50
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.  
51
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twentieth century.   
Amy Sinden has called human rights law ―the law‘s best response to profound, 
unthinkable, far-reaching moral transgression.‖
53
 It should thus come as no surprise that 
many are eager to invoke the ―law‘s best response‖ in response to climate change. And, 
indeed there are invocations of international human rights norms throughout the climate 
change discourse as legislators, regulators and advocates seek to deploy ―the power of 
human rights‖
54
 in this new struggle. 
   
B.  Environmental Rights Under International Law 
 
In making the argument that environmental regulators should rely on human rights to 
inform their decisionmaking, it is important not to overstate the relationship between 
human rights and environmental rights. Human rights and environmental protection trace 
their origins back to very different legal traditions and sources. To over-generalize, 
human rights are rooted in the natural law tradition in international law while 
environmental law is the product of a much more state-centered positive law tradition.
55
 
More significantly, environmental law does not have protecting human beings qua 
individuals at its core in the same fashion that human rights law does. Indeed, 
environmental law‘s most distinctive feature is that it responds to the ramifications of 
human impacts on the natural environment.
56
 By contrast, even when invoked in the 
environmental context, human rights focus on protecting the human victims of 
environmental degradation
57
 rather than on protecting the environment itself.
58
 Human 
rights are, after all inherently anthropocentric.
59
 This distinction helps explain why the 
two legal discourses have evolved along very different tracks. That said, there are 
obvious points of intersection and overlap between environmental rights and human 
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55
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The first formal international law recognition of the links between environmental 
protection and human rights occurred in the Stockholm Declaration, adopted by the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.  Principle 1 of this Declaration 
proclaims that: 
 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being, and he bears the solemn responsibility to protect and improve 




The 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
62
 
(UNCED or the Rio Conference) focused global attention on environmental concerns and 
more particularly on the unsustainable nature of human activities. More importantly, the 
Rio Declaration marked a global recognition that human activity was undermining the 
integrity of natural systems on which human life and society depend. Yet the Rio 
Declaration did not, as some had hoped, announce a human right to a healthy 
environment.  In fact, considering the fact that such language had been proposed and 
rejected from the Declaration, Rio may in fact represent a significant step away from 
such a commitment. From Rio onward, an explosion of international treaty-making 
produced a wealth of multilateral environmental agreements covering everything from 
access to environmental information
63
 to greenhouse gas emissions
64
 to persistent organic 
pollutants.
65
  None of these agreements have employed an explicit human rights framing, 
and most do not mention human rights.
66
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Yet that does not mean there have been no international initiatives concerning the 
human right to a healthy environment. In 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted a 
resolution declaring ―that all persons have the right to live in an environment which is 
adequate to ensure their health and welfare.‖
67
 In 1994, the United Nations‘ Draft 
Principles on Human Rights and the Environment proposed explicitly consolidating these 
norms into an articulated right to a ―satisfactory environment‖
68
 by declaring that ―[a]ll 
persons have the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.‖
69
  As 
proposed, this right would encompass the right to be free ―from pollution, environmental 
degradation and activities that adversely affect the environment‖
70
 as well as a positive 
right to ―protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, and the essential processes and 
areas necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems.‖
71
 Fifteen years later, 
however, the prospect for any such clear declaration of a human right to a healthy 
environment seems quite distant.
72
  
Even as progress stalled on articulating a free-standing human environmental right, 
other parts of the Draft Principles on Human Right and the Environment seem to have 
some legs. For example, Principle 10 specifically provided that: 
Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at 
the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access 
to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including 
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including 
redress and remedy, shall be provided.
 73
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amenable to being, and have been, used to secure incidental environmental objectives.  It is something 
altogether [sic] to proceed from this evidence to the postulation of an existing fundamental right to a clean 
environment.‖ Handl, supra note __ at 128 (cautioning against misrepresenting aspirational environmental 
human rights concepts as hard law, and recommending avoiding ―talismanic invocations of non-binding 
resolutions‖ and other forms of soft law). 
73




This emphasis on participation reiterates almost verbatim the procedural rights endorsed 
by Principle 10 of the Rio Convention.
74
 Principle 18 of the Draft Human Rights Accord 
elaborates on this broad endorsement of participation, explaining that the right to 
participate extends to ―planning and decision-making activities and processes that may 
have an impact on the environment and development.‖
75
 This commitment to 
participation was ratified, albeit on the state level, in the Epoo Convention
76
 then 
enshrined as an individual right in the Aarhus Convention.
77
 The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change similarly provides for public participation.
78
 
These conventions, along with relevant international tribunal decisions, declarations 
and soft law instruments, have generated a host of international norms in the context of 
environmental rights.
79
 At the same time that these concepts are being elaborated, there is 
also a vigorous debate about whether they have coalesced into a new customary law—the 
right to a healthy environment.
80
  Rather than wade into those murky waters, this article 
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 Principle 10 provides: Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on 
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-
making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress 
and remedy, shall be provided. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, A/Conf.151/26 (14 June 
1992) available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentID=78&articleID=1163.  
75
 Draft Principles, supra note 68 at Princ. 18.   
76
 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) 
(Feb. 25, 1991), Art. 3, available at 
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/legaltexts/conventiontextenglish.pdf.  The Epoo Convention 
guarantees non-discriminatory public participation in environmental impact procedures. Art. 2(6) provides 
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Party of origin.‖ 
77
 The full name of the agreement commonly known as the Aarhus Convention is the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, adopted in Aarhus (Denmark) on 25 June 1998 . The Preamble to the Aarhus Convention 
―recognize[s] that adequate protection of the environment is essential to human wellbeing and the 
enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to life itself.‖ 
78
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.  In 
particular Article 4(1)(i) obliges states to ―encourage the widest participation . . . including that of non-
governmental organizations.‖ Article 6 requires that parties promote and facilitate public access to 
information and public participation.  
79
 Over the past few decades, there has been increased linkage between human rights and 
environmental protection.  In particular, scholars have written extensively about the viability of substantive 
environmental rights claimed as human rights, and of procedural rights in environmental decisionmaking 
claimed as human rights. See e.g., Ole W. Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and 
Environmental Rights: A Long Time Coming? 21 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 74 (2008); Louis E. 
Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under International Law? It Depends 
on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT‘L ENVTL. L & POL‘Y 1, 9 (2001); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, 
Environmental Rights and the Right to the Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT‘L L. 103, 105 (1991). 
80
 Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly Revisionist View, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117 (1992); Phillip Alston, 
Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 Am. J. Int‘l L. 607 (1984).  See 




brackets the question of whether these emerging norms amount to an international human 
right to a wholesome environment.  Regardless of whether these environmental norms 
amount to a human right on their own, they undoubtedly enrich our understanding of 
human rights clearly articulated in the Universal Declaration
81
 and the Human Rights 
Conventions
82









Weermantry, for one, has characterized protecting the environment as ―a vital part of 
contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights 
such as the right to health and the right to life itself.‖
87
 The United Nations Human Rights 
Council recently reaffirmed that climate change ―has implications for the full enjoyment 
of human rights‖ and proposed a detailed analytical study of the relationship between 
climate change and human rights.
88
  
Moreover, these emerging environmental norms certainly represent a gathering 
international consensus about the relationship between states and individuals vis-à-vis the 
environment, and about the association between international environmental norms and 
already-established human rights.
89
  As interpretive tools, these norms can assist 
                                                                                                                                                 
Anderson eds., 1996). Along these lines, not a single alien tort claim case alleging violation of 
environmental rights has been successful. See e.g.,  Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (dismissing environmental alien tort claim suit on political doctrine grounds); Flores v. Southern 
Peru Copper Corp., 414 F. 3d 233 251-52 (2d Cir. 2003) (dismissing environmental claim on the ground 
that the human rights to life, health and sustainable development were not yet jus cogens norms); Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMorran, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. La. 1997)(finding that environmental tort allegations 
did not allege a violation of a ―universal, definable and obligatory‖ international norm); Aguinda v. 
Texaco, Inc. 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration might 
constitute a  binding international environmental norm but dismissing the case on forum non conveniens 
grounds); Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp. 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (1991)(finding that Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration did not constitute a binding international norm). 
81
 Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Right to the Environment, 28 STAN. J. 
INT‘L L. 103 (1991). 
82
 The two main human rights covenants are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).  There are numerous other human rights covenants 
including:  
83
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 3, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  
84
 Id. at Art. 25. ICESCR cite.  One limitation of relying on the right to health as the basis for 
environmental rights is that, like all rights in the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, it is subject to ―progressive realization‖ which means that its contours depend on the resources of 
the state concerned.  
85
 Id. at Art. 27, ICESCR cite 
86
 Id. at Art. 17.  Because of the politics of the cold war, the right to property was not codified in the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR.  It is, however, guaranteed by the African Charter, supra note __ Art. 14; 
American Convention, supra note __ Art. 21; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol No.1, art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ.  T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.   
87
 See Gabc íkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 91 (Sept. 25) (Separate Opinion 
of J. Weermantry). 
88
 Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 7, U.N. HRC, 7
th
 Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/7/L.21/Rev.1 (Mar. 26, 2008), available at 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=13920.  The resolution was adopted without a vote.  
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=080328.  
89




decisionmakers in the domestic regulatory sphere regardless of their precise status under 
international law. 
 
C.  Key Environmental Human Rights Norms of Use in 
Regulatory Decisionmaking 
 
This section provides a brief introduction to the human rights norms of prior informed 
consent, participation and transparency. These international rights are not limited to the 
environmental decisionmaking context, nor are they the only human rights that might be 
relevant to environmental decisions. However, these rights are particularly important in 
the environmental context, and they also overlap significantly with statutory 
decisionmaking procedures already enshrined in domestic law. Given, this overlap, they 
are of particular interesting to anyone looking to use human rights to promote better 
regulatory decisionmaking. 
 One means by which international human rights discourse has intersected with 
environmental protection has been litigation in which communities argue that their 
justiciable human rights are violated by activities that promote climate change.  Along 
these lines, the Inuit people filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights claiming that the acts and omissions of the United States with respect to 
climate change are violating their human rights by destroying their Arctic home.
90
 
Although it made headlines, the suit has so far gone nowhere.
91
 Communities in Africa‘s 
Niger Delta had more success suing Shell Oil
92
 on the theory that its wasteful practice of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 71, 91-94 (2005) (proposing a four variable matrix for 
assessing whether environmental harms constitute human rights violations). 
90
 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (Dec. 7, 2005), 
available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/petition-to-the-inter-american-commission-on-
human-rights-on-behalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf. For an indepth discussion of the Inuit 
Petition, see Hari Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous 
People’s Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007). 
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 The Inuit petition was dismissed without prejudice in 2006. Andrew C. Revkin, Inuit Climate Change 
Petition Rejected, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2006, at A9.  The Commission held hearings in early 2007.  See Martin 
Wagner, Testimony Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http:// 
www.ciel.org/Publications/IACHR_Wagner_Mar07.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2009); see also Sheila Watt-
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 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005, Order (Nov. 14, 
2005), available at www.climate-law.org/cases.  Shell has reportedly failed to comply with the court order 
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Flaring, Again (May 2m 2007) available at 
http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/country/nigeria/media/2007May2/. The World Bank estimates that the 
quantity of gas being flared and vented annually amounts to 25% of the United State‘s annual natural gas 
consumption.  Indeed, the quantity of natural gas flared in Africa each year equals half of that continent‘s 
power consumption. World Bank, Oil Producing Countries, Companies Can Help Mitigate Impact of 
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http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTOGMC/EXTGGFR/0,,contentMDK:21126
868~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:578069,00.html. Similarly, the African Commission 
on Human and People‘s Rights found that Nigeria violated rights of the Ogoni people by aiding and 
participating in oil extraction in their region.  Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, OAU Doc. 




―gas flaring,‖ which contributed more greenhouse gas emissions than all of the other sub-
Saharan African sources combined, constituted a human rights violation.
93
 There is also a 
growing body of precedent concerning environmental issues as human rights violations in 
both the European
94
 and Inter-American human rights systems.
95
  These cases help put 
flesh to the bones of the emerging international norms about the environment.  
In particular, this jurisprudence, together with the various human rights and 
environmental regimes, establishes some clear principles that can enrich domestic 
regulatory deliberations. Most notable among these are three procedural rights: the right 
of prior informed consent;
96





                                                                                                                                                 
(hereafter ―Ogoniland Case‖); see generally Dinah L. Shelton, Decision Regarding Communication 155/96 
(Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr./Ctr. for Econ. and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria). Case No. 
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, 96 AM. J. INT‘L L. 937 (2002).The Commission concluded that Nigeria violated 
the right to health and the right to a healthy environment guaranteed by the African Charter.  The 
Ogoniland Case involved a challenge to the practices of disposing toxic wastes from oil production directly 
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2. 
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 World Bank, Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association and the 
International Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on an Interim Strategy Update for the 
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has refused to consider environmental claims under this statute. The complaint in Wiwa v. Shell is 
available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/11.8.96%20%20Wiwa%20Complaint.pdf.  
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 Budayeva v. Russia, App. No. 15339/02 at 26 ECHR [2008]; Taskin v.Turkey, 42 EHRR [2006] 50; 
Fadeyeva v. Russia, EHRR[2005] 376; Lopez Ostra v. Spain 20 EHRR [1995] 277; Guerra & Others v. Italy, 
App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 383 (1998) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). For a scholarly exploration of these 
cases, see Loukis Loucaides, Environmental Protection through the Jurisprudence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 249 (2005); Richard Desgagne, Integrating 
Environmental Values into the European Convention of Human Rights, 89 AM. J. INT‘L L. 263 (1995); 
Dinah Shelton, Human Rights and the Environment: Jurisprudence of Human Rights Bodies, 32 ENVTL. 
POL. & L.158, 162 (2002)(surveying decisions). 
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 See Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Report No. 40/04, 
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 727 (2004); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni 
Community v Nicaragua (2001), Inter-AM Ser. C, No. 79; Yanomani Indians v. Brazil, Decision 7615, 
Inter-Am.C.H.R., Inter-American YB on Hum.Rts. 264 (1985). Several other claims have been held 
admissible: Yakye Axa Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua people v. Paraguay, Case 12.313, 
Report No. 2/02, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Doc.5 rev. 1 at 387 (2002); The Kichwa Peoples of the Sarayaku 
community and its members v. Ecuador, Case 167/03, Report No. 62/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122 Doc. 5 rev. 1 at 308 (2004). 
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 The right of advanced informed consent is the centerpiece of the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 
http://www.pic.int/en/ConventionText/RC%20text_2008_E.pdf.  It also plays a central role in the regimes 
created by the Cartagena Protocol and the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208 
[hereinafter Cartagena Protocol]; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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The following sections will describe each right in turn and will highlight how these 
procedural rights relate to precautionary decisionmaking, another emerging international 
norm, albeit one that is quite controversial in the United States.
99
 (The substantive 
international environmental norms of: intergenerational equity;
100
 common but 
differentiated responsibilities;
101
 and the polluter pays principle
102
 will not be discussed 
in this analysis.) These international norms can help regulators better implement existing 
domestic laws governing public participation in environmental decisionmaking.  This 
observation bears an obvious relationship to recent new governance scholarship,
103
 but 
differs from that line of reasoning because it advocates interpreting existing procedures 
through a human rights lens in order to develop a more robust understanding of existing 
statutory goals and procedures, rather than suggesting new procedures to achieve 
additional governance goals.  
The following sections briefly sketch out the contours of these key international 
environmental norms, with an eye toward highlighting those aspects most likely to be 
relevant to domestic environmental regulators looking for guidance as they engage in 
discretionary decisionmaking.  
 
1. Prior Informed Consent 
 
 A mainstay of modern medical ethics, informed consent requires that physicians 
obtain the voluntarily consent of a patient, which must be based on adequate information, 
before subjecting that patient to medical procedures.
104
 Rooted in the principle of 
―autonomy in medical decisionmaking,‖ informed consent reflects the notion that a 
                                                                                                                                                 
25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 450, available at http:// www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf 
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. In particular, Article 1 of the Aarhus Convention guarantees access to 
information, public participation , and access to justice in environmental matters.  
98
 See Aarhus Convention, Art. 1, supra note 97. 
99
 This is probably the most controversial of the emerging norms.  See generally. THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone and Ellen 
Hay, eds. 1995). For a full discussion of how this principle played out in the dispute between the United 
States and the European Union over genetically modified agricultural crops, see Gregory Shaffer and Mark 
Pollack, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS (2009) 
100
 EDITH BROWN-WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 17-46 (1989).  Intergenerational 
equity is also invoked in Art. 1 of the Aarhus Convention.  
101
 Dinah Shelton, Describing the Elephant: International Justice and Environmental Law 55-63, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT (Jonal Ebbesson & Phoebe Okowa, eds. 2009). See e.g., 
Philippe Sands, International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles 54-
66 in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Winfried Lang, ed. 1995) (describing all the 
emerging international environmental law principles listed in the text above.)  
102
 The polluter pays principle dates back to the Trail Smelter Arbitration and is among the most 
venerable and well-established principles of international environmental law.  For a full discussion of the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, including edited versions of the decisions themselves, see generally REBECCA M. 
BRATSPIES & RUSSELL A. MILLER, TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE 
TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION (2006)  
103
 See e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 270 (1998); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 
54 DUKE L. J. 795 (2005); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 356-61 (2004). 
104
 Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 595 (2006). See 




fundamental aspect of personhood is the freedom from unwanted or unauthorized 
physical contact.
105
 In short, this legal concept, which flows from traditional tort law, 
recognizes that the essence of being a person, rather than an object is the ability to have 
some say in what happens to one, particularly with regard to bodily integrity.  Thus, prior 
informed consent is a profound recognition of the humanity of those whose consent is 
being sought. 
For this reason, as the concept was imported into the international environmental 
arena, it became closely identified with environmental human rights.  The Basel 
Convention
106
 and the Cartagena Protocol
107
 both contain explicit provisions requiring 
prior informed consent from affected states. The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior 
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals in International Trade is 
the definitive statement of international law on this point.
108
 Parties to the Convention 
commit not to export certain specified chemicals to the other state parties unless those 
states explicitly consent.
109
 The Convention secretariat acts as a clearinghouse for these 
state decisions and provides other support to facilitate state implementation of the 
Convention.  
These treaty-based consent instruments mark an impressive international statement 
about the centrality of prior informed consent. However, they share a common limitation. 
They treat prior informed consent as an aspect of state sovereignty. Their principle 
achievement is to insert the national government as a gatekeeper between private actors 
that wish to engage in a particular transaction involving hazardous substances.  The 
thinking behind this requirement is that the private actors are likely not giving adequate 
attention to the public concerns inherent in such a transaction. The state‘s consent is 
therefore solicited to ensure that public concerns are not compromised by the otherwise 
private decision.  This requirement also seeks to rectify one of the lingering effects of 
colonialism—the exploitation of national resources by foreign entities conducted without 
attention to the costs and benefit of that exploitation for the state in which those resources 
are found.  
While certainly important for international equity, this focus on prior informed 
consent as an aspect of national sovereignty means that the impact of these procedures is 
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 Atwell, supra note 104 at 594. 
106
 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.190/4, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989). 
107
 Article 19(3) of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity provides: ―The Parties shall 
consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate procedures, including, in 
particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living 
modified organisms resulting from biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity.‖ The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety implements this directive by 
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international transboundary movement of living modified organisms for intentional introduction into the 
environment. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 
I.L.M. 1027 (2000). For an explanation of the import of this provision, see Sabrina Safrin, The Biosafety 
Protocol: A Landmark International Agreement, 10 MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 63, 68-69 (2001). 
108
 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade, available at http://www.pic.int/home.php?type=t&id=49&sid=16.  
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relatively limited.  They require only that the state consent to activity within its borders 
that originates from outside the state, and offer no protection to sub-national units 
unwilling to host activities consented to by the state.
110
  These international prior 
informed consent provisions do nothing to respond to the well-documented problem of 
states authorizing exploitation with little or no attention to the needs of the populations 
most directly affected.
111
 Particularly with regard to indigenous peoples, this problem has 
long been a vexing aspect of international development aid and investment.
112
 
Responding to this serious gap in international law, there is a long tradition of soft 
law instruments recognizing the need for prior informed consent at the sub-national 
level.
113
  In particular, the World Bank has made some progress in articulating the need 
for prior informed consent from indigenous and local stakeholders in its funding 
priorities.
114
 The recently adopted Declaration of Indigenous Rights emphasizes prior 
informed consent as an aspect of the right to property, the right to culture and the right to 
indigenous people‘s sovereignty.
115
 The gap between the letter of these documents and 
their implementation notwithstanding, this concept is continually being further developed 
and refined in the international arena.  
At least one international human rights court has interpreted human rights as 
requiring significantly more from prior informed consent.  The Inter-American Court of 
                                                 
110
 This is not universally true for international soft law documents.  For example, Article 26(d) of the 
Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
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DEV. L & POL‘Y 43, 49 (Summer 2004); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Inter-agency Support 
Group on Indigenous Issues Report on Free Prior and Informed Consent E/C.19/2004/11 ¶ 46 (May 2004) 
[hereinafter UNESC]; World Bank Group, STRIKING A BETTER BALANCE: THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
REVIEW (2003), available at http:// go.worldbank.org/PIW55278X0 (recommending that prior informed 
consent be obtained from local communities); LYLA MEHTA & MARIA STANKOVITCH, 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF FREE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT 5, 10 (2000). See also WORLD COMM‘N ON 
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING, THE REPORT OF THE WORLD 
COMMISSION ON DAMS (2000), available at http://www.dams.org.  
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Human Rights has recognized prior informed consent as a central aspect of the right to 
property and the right to culture for indigenous groups.
116
 This interpretation of prior 
informed consent protects sub-national units, particularly indigenous groups, from the 
actions of the state.
117
  This interpretation is wholly consistent with the African 
Commission‘s human rights ruling in the Ogoniland Case.
118
  Both cases upheld the right 
to meaningful consultation, which necessarily entails meaningful opportunities to be 
heard and to participate in development decisions affecting the communities.
119
  
The United States is not a signatory to either the treaties or many of the soft-law 
agreements that require prior informed consent, nor has it consented to the jurisdiction of 
the Inter-American Court.  As a result, neither the treaties nor the tribunal decisions are 
legally binding on the United States. Nevertheless, there is much that United States 
domestic regulators might learn from the developing international notion of prior 
informed consent that would be informative as those regulators implement analogous 
requirements under domestic law. In particular, domestic regulators might internalize the 
notion that it is the government‘s responsibility to empower the individuals and groups 
most affected by environmental problems in order to facilitate their participation in 




2. Access to Information and Transparency 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has on more than one occasion evaluated 
procedures for environmental decisionmaking through a human rights lens. Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees freedom to receive and impart 
information. Although this provision creates neither a right to access information nor a 
duty to disclose information, subsequent legal developments, in particular Council 
Directive 2003/4
121
 have fleshed out this right as requiring access to environmental 
information.
122
 Reading Article 10 with Articles 2 and 8, the European Court of Human 
Rights has concluded that information about environmental risks must be made available 
to those likely to be affected.
123
 This requirement includes an obligation for the state to 
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provide access to studies and assessments carried out as part of the environmental and 
economic policy decisionmaking process.
124
  
At the same time, the Aarhus Convention preamble explicitly recognizes the nexus 
between environmental protection and human rights.
125
  Article 1 provides that ―in order 
to contribute to the protection of the right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each 
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public participation in decision-
making, and access to justice.‖
126
 These three, interrelated rights, which find elaboration 
throughout the rest of the convention, give legal force to the ideas enshrined in Principle 
10 of the Rio Declaration.   
 The European Court of Human Rights has also weighed in on the scope of a right 
of access to information. Under certain circumstances, the ECHR has concluded that this 
right to information can require much more from the state than merely having a 
procedure for providing information that is requested. Instead, this right can sometimes 
include a positive state duty to inform, not merely a right of access to information.
127
 This 
jurisprudence lines up with the Aarhus Convention‘s positive duty to inform, which 
extends beyond merely having a process for providing requested information.
128
 
Interpreting this requirement, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe have 
concluded that the Convention imposes an obligation for states to take the measures 
necessary ―to ensure that public authorities organise the environmental information which 
is relevant to their functions and which is held by or for them, with a view to its active 
and systematic dissemination to the public.‖
129
 
 While none of these developments bind the United States, that fact alone does not 
end the conversation about their possible usefulness. As many law professors are fond of 
reminding their students, an otherwise nonbinding legal precedent, norm or principle 
becomes so-called ―persuasive authority‖ precisely because it persuades the 
decisionmaker.
130
 As domestic regulators grapple with the interpretation of analogous 
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provisions under United States law, it may well make sense for them to draw examples 
and lessons from this well-developed parallel body of knowledge about access to 
information.  
 
3. Public Participation  
 
 Recent events demonstrate the ever-widening scope of the right to participate. In 
December 2009, Micronesia challenged the renewal of a Czech refinery‘s operating 
permit on the ground that regulators had to consider the facility‘s outsized carbon 
footprint and the transboundary effects these emissions would have in Micronesia.
131
 By 
demanding the right to participate in this domestic Czech regulatory decision, Micronesia 
dramatically re-interpreted conventional notions of public participation.  Czech 
authorities agreed to Micronesia‘s request, and are conducting a review under 
international auspices.
132
 According to Greenpeace, this move is intended to be the 
opening salvo as states vulnerable to climate change explore new avenues to challenge 
decisions on projects that contribute to climate change.
 133
  
Although not directly framed in the language of human rights, this decision will have 
obvious implications for the ongoing discourse about the relationship between public 
participation and human rights.  This normative relationship is underscored in the 
European Court of Human Rights‘ jurisprudence suggesting that, at least for some 
decisions, participation in the decisionmaking process by those affected by environmental 
decisions is a basic human right.
134
 Additionally, the Aarhus Convention, which 
explicitly links participation and human rights, requires a right to participate as a basic 
element of its framework of environmental process.
135
 Under the Convention, states are 
required to inform the public of a proposed activity in an adequate, effective, and timely 
manner; to provide a reasonable timeframe to inspect materials, to make comments; and 
to promptly inform the public about the ultimate decision.
136
 However, the Convention‘s 
requirements go far beyond this minimal vision of public participation.  
 The Aarhus Convention gives detailed and specific meaning to the generic ‗right 
to participate‘ that is a central principle to most democratic theory and is viewed 
throughout much of the world as a fundamental human right as well as a right created by 
positive law.
137
 While the United States is not a party to the Aarhus Convention, and 
therefore is not bound by its provisions, that does not preclude the US from learning from 
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the experiences of those states that are.  For example, one important aspect of the 
Convention‘s public participation provisions is that they apply not only to particular 
projects but also to overall planning and policy development.
138
 Public participation at 
these earlier, less visible stages of decisionmaking can help shape the context within 
which particular projects are proposed, authorized or rejected.  Indeed, the very drafting 
of the Convention modeled this kind of participatory inclusion, with NGOs taking an 
unusual and prominent role in the drafting, negotiation and implementation of the 
Convention.
139
 This type of approach might have resonance in the ongoing domestic 
debate over the scope and timing of public participation in United States rulemaking.  
 International law has devoted considerable time and energy fleshing out the 
contours of prior informed consent, participation and transparency and access to 
information. This accumulated pool of wisdom offers a valuable resource to United 
States regulators as they seek to improve domestic regulation.  Because of some striking 
similarities in the domestic and international regimes, United States regulators might 
fruitfully draw on the intellectual fruits of these international law labors. 
 
III. TESTING THE THEORY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION 
 
The United States has historically been in the environmental vanguard—leading the 
world in developing innovative substantive and procedural requirements like: 
environmental impact statement, innovative transparency mechanisms like the Freedom 
of Information Act and the Toxic Release Inventory, and the notion that regulatory 
standards can be used to force the development of more environmentally-sound 
technologies. For decades, public sentiment in the United States overwhelmingly 
supported this environmental regulatory apparatus.
140
 Yet, over the last decades, the 
United States has become an environmental laggard—failing to participate in key 
international environmental regimes,
141
 and eroding regulatory rigor by overreliance on 
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 At the same time, allegations of environmental 
injustice continue to dog many environmental regulatory processes.
143
 As a result, the 
United States environmental regulatory system has lost much of its momentum. With 
environmental regulation and administrative law stagnating or regressing, an infusion of 
new ideas from international human rights law might help regulators chart a new 
regulatory course that will better protect the environment while also building public trust 
in the regulatory process.  
To examine this point, we will begin by examining how the norms of prior-informed 
consent, participation, and transparency and access to information are already constructed 
in domestic law, and will identify the points where these existing domestic instantiations 
of these international norms fall short. This section will then highlight two key challenges 
for domestic environmental decisionmaking: uncertainty and environmental justice. 
Finally, this section will end by showing how a closer embrace of international norms 
within the domestic regulatory process might being to overcome those challenges.  
 
A.  The Existing Regulatory Scaffolding  
 
One of the most important procedural innovations in United States environmental law 
is the role that citizen suit provisions play in enforcing environmental laws. It is also an 
area where domestic regulation stands to benefit the most from an infusion of new ideas 
from international human rights.  
Almost every anti-pollution law authorizes citizens to act as ―private attorneys 
general‖ and sue to enforce environmental laws when regulators fail to live up to 
statutory enforcement duties.
144
 These laws permit citizens to bring enforcement against 
violators, and to sue to force agencies to discharge nondiscretionary duties. Through 
these provisions, Congress has authorized citizens to become directly involved with the 
process of enforcing environmental standards and to pursue their environmental interests 
when the state fails to do so on their behalf.  These statutes thus provide for individual 
enforcement of duly promulgated environmental standards, should the government fail to 
do so in its representative capacity.  
In addition to environmental statutes that create specific public enforcement 
rights, additional legislative enactments create a clear set of participatory rights and 
requirements. For example, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that ―agenc[ies] 
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate‖
145
 in proposed rulemaking 
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decisions and to ―petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.‖
146
    As the 
D.C. Circuit noted two decades ago:  
[u]nder our system of government, the very legitimacy of general 
policymaking performed by unelected regulators depends in no small part 
upon the openness, accessibility and amenity of these officials to the needs 
and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives and 




  Note how similar these rights are to aspects of the emerging environmental norms of 
access to information and prior informed consent that are part of the putative right to a 
healthy environment.
148
 Some argue that these environmental rights have largely been 
read out of the domestic environmental statutes. NEPA, in particular, has been interpreted 
to create predominantly procedural, rather than substantive rights.
149
 As a result, its 
putative role as an ―environmental Magna Carta‖
150
 and as ―a national charter for 
protection of the environment‖
151
 has been blunted. At the same time, unambiguous 
environmental commitments in the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and other 
environmental statutes have been interpreted creatively to diminish environmental rights 
into mere ―interests‖ that can be weighed against costs and other ―interests.‖ This framing 
creates a structural disadvantage because the environmental stake, which has dwindled 
into an ―interest‖ must frequently face off against property interests, which are given the 
status of rights.
152
  More fundamentally, the doctrines of standing
153
 and political 
question
154
 have been used to limit the scope of who can access the courts in order to 
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claim these rights.  Would-be environmental litigants find themselves at a cross-road— 
with their main path of past vindication, the courts, becoming less available.  The 
legislature has not indicated much appetite to fill this void, indeed a host of 
environmental proposals have languished in the past few Congressional sessions.
155
  
Even without new laws, and with access to the federal courts becoming more 
difficult, human rights norms might still be a tool for more effectively realizing the 
environmental rights guaranteed under federal law. Achieving this outcome entails 
recognizing that regulators sit in a locus of ―authoritative decisionmaking,‖ and bringing 
human rights norms to the regulators themselves. In particular, the international norms of 
prior informed consent, participation and transparency and access to information might 
help regulators apprehend and employ their existing regulatory discretion in a fashion 
more likely to achieve environmental outcomes, and at the same time more likely to 
rebuild public trust in the regulatory enterprise. In short, a human rights framing might 
reshape the contours of what is currently considered appropriate exercise of discretion in 
order to make regulatory decisionmaking more transparent, more responsive and more 
fair.     
Nowhere is the need for new regulatory approaches clearer than in the nascent 
regulatory response to climate change—the most pressing regulatory challenge of our 
lifetime.
156
  The regulatory response began in earnest when EPA announced its intention 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under Section 202 of the Clean Air Act
157
 and 
announced reporting rules for stationary sources.
158
 Rapidly on the heels of these 
announcements, the SEC issued greenhouse gas guidance.
159
  Far more will be required, 
and many agencies will find themselves forced to grapple with regulatory challenges 
presented by climate change—ranging from the Army Corps of Engineers rethinking 
wetlands development as storm intensities magnify, to the Fisheries and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) accounting for climate change in designating and protecting endangered species, 
to the Department of Transportation reconsidering CAFÉ standards.  
These agencies, and many others, face hard choices that will impose significant costs 
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on the public in order to (they hope) confer benefits.
 160
  Worse, regulators will not be 
able to avoid making high stakes regulatory choices that implicate poorly understood 
risks. Under these conditions, trust in the agency decisionmaking processes will be 
particularly important. Without confidence that the agency procedures are fair and 
inclusive, and that the agency is making decisions in the public‘s interest, there is a real 
danger that any choices made under conditions of uncertainty will provide fodder for 
anger, social disaffection and cynicism. Agencies are often put in this role. Given the 
pervasive scientific uncertainty surrounding many environmental regulatory decisions, 
Congress has often elected to vest expert regulators with significant discretion to assess 
risks, probabilities and costs.
161
 Courts are often reluctant to second-guess these expert 
decisions made on ―the frontiers of science.‖
162
  Thus, getting the initial regulatory 
decisions right is critical. 
The struggle over information and decisionmaking in the context of climate change is 
clear. In rulemakings, lawsuits and public opinion, a handful of scientists and 
environmental groups jockey for influence against industry-funded climate deniers.
163
 
Lost in the cacophony is any genuine public dialogue about the rapid environmental 
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changes we are witnessing,
164
 or what those changes will mean for our carbon-based 
economy.
165
 As the United States grapples with the proper balance between the nation‘s 
immediate economic crisis and its long-term sustainability interests,
166
 regulators should 
consider drawing on human rights norms to make regulatory responses fairer, more 
transparent, and more effective.  
 
B.  Balancing Expertise and Participation 
 
Because agencies rest a bit uncomfortably within a constitutional system premised on 
a separation of powers, regulators are often reluctant to acknowledge the political 
implications of their discretionary decisionmaking.  Instead, they tend to portray the 
questions within their purview as scientific and technical rather than political. The main 
advantage of such a characterization is that it renders the decisions in question 
susceptible to expert decisionmaking. One unfortunate side effect of this ‗expert-izing‘ of 
regulatory decisionmaking is that framing regulatory decisions as based on expertise has 
a direct and limiting impact on how agencies approach issues of participation, 
transparency and access to information.
167
 Another is that it allows regulators to dismiss, 
or even be contemptuous of the risk preferences and priorities expressed by the public, 
thereby bracketing questions surrounding different perceptions about acceptability of 
risk,
168




The temptation toward an expertise framing is easy to appreciate. Certainly, 
regulators must pay attention to science, and make decisions supported by evidence.  
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 See e.g., John M. Broder, Past Decade Warmest on Record, NASA Records Show, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Jan.21, 2010) available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/science/earth/22warming.html; 
Morris A. Bender, et al.,  Modeled Impact of Anthropogenic Warming on the Frequency of Intense Atlantic 
Hurricanes, 321 SCIENCE 454 (Jan. 22, 2010)   
165
 See Doug Koplow & John Dernbach, Federal Fossil Fuel Subsidies and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions: A Case Study of Increasing Transparency for Fiscal Responsibility, 26 Ann. Rev. Energy 
Environ. 361 (2010). Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38 ENV. 
L. REP.: NEWS AND ANALYSIS 10,287 (2008). As of this writing (August 2010) atmospheric carbon 
concentrations were 392.24 ppm—representing an increase of 2 ppm a year since 1959.  Current carbon 
concentrations are available at the website of the organization ‗CO2 Now‘, www.co2now.org.  
166
 For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oust/fedlaws/publ_109-058.pdf, and The Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ140.110, both embody these contradictions 
with their dual emphasis on increasing domestic fossil fuel production and also increasing energy 
efficiency and alternative fuels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. President Obama‘s recent decision to 
open vast portions of the continental shelf to oil and gas exploration suggests that this focus on increasing 
domestic production remains unchanged, see e.g., John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to 
Drilling for the First Time, N.Y. Times A.1 (March 30, 2010) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/science/earth/31energy.html, even as the President also expresses 
commitments to lowering the United States‘ carbon footprint. 
167
 See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing 
Science, 41 MINERVA 223 (2003); P.E. Slatter, Building Expert Systems: Cognitive Emulation 37 (1987) 
(describing the tendency of experts to take their own lack of knowledge about a hypothesis as evidence of 








That means avoiding decisions based on either political expedience or wild swings of 
public opinion.  But, rarely are regulatory decisions wholly about science. Instead, most 
regulatory decisions are about policy—choosing which risks are acceptable in a 
democratic society, and then deciding who should bear those risks. In making those kinds 
of choices, regulators should always be mindful of the limits of technical expertise
170
 to 
answer questions of acceptability and equity.  
One problem with framing regulatory decisions as wholly scientific rather than a 
combination of scientific and social decisionmaking is that such a framing makes it easy 
to ignore the social aspects of a regulatory decision, and to dismiss concerns articulated 
by the general public. Experts are notorious for overestimating the importance of their 
field of expertise and underestimating what other perspectives might contribute.
171
 The 
―unwillingness to reflect on the status of their own knowledge,‖
172
 can obscure 
significant gaps in information. This intellectual hubris
173
 is further exacerbated by the 
tendency to defer to the opinion of an ―expert‖ in public discourse, even when the 
opinion concerns matters beyond (and sometimes only distantly related to) the person‘s 
area of expertise. This kind of ―expert haloing‖ unfortunately lends itself to strategic 
behavior by those with an interest in hampering regulatory responses to otherwise 
obvious problems.
174
 For example, by the late 1980s, climate experts had concluded with 
surprising unanimity that the increased releases of greenhouse gases from human 
activities would significantly raise the earth‘s temperature in the next century.
 175
 Yet two 
decades later, so-called experts (albeit not climatologists) are still opining to the contrary, 
allowing politicians and industry groups to continue claiming that the connection 
between carbon emissions and climate change is unproven.
176
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 I have previously written about the problems associated with regulatory expertise. See Rebecca 
Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, 51 Arizona L. Rev. 575 (2009). 
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 See generally Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility, supra n. 167; P.E. Slatter, Building Expert 
Systems: Cognitive Emulation 37 (1987) (describing the tendency of experts to take their own lack of 
knowledge about a hypothesis as evidence of its falsity). Brian Wynne‘s work documenting the disastrously 
wrong advice that so-called experts provided to Cumbrian sheepherders in the wake of Chernobyl 
highlights how prone experts are to the pitfall of not appreciating key aspects of a problem. Brian Wynne, 
Misunderstood misunderstanding: social identities and public uptake of science, 1 PUBLIC UNDERSTAND. 
SCI. 281, 283–87 (1992). Wynne describes the inconsistency between ―the certainty pervading public 
scientific statements and the uncertainties involved in actually attempting to create definite scientific 
knowledge in . . . novel and open-ended circumstances.‖ Id. at 293.  
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 Wynne, supra n. 171 at 29. 
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 Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 
82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 567 (2007). Sheila Jasanoff asserts that modern societies have devoted inordinate 
resources to developing ―technologies of hubris.‖ Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility supra note __ at 238. 
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 This is not to suggest that only expert decisionmaking is subject to strategic behavior.  However, an 
expertise-based decisionmaking framework may be less prepared to cope with this kind of strategic 
behavior because it presumes a detached neutrality as a core attribute of experts.  
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 Stephen H. Schneider, The Greenhouse Effect: Science and Policy, 243 SCIENCE 771, 771 (1989).  
176
 See NAOMI ORESKES AND ERIK CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS 
OBSCURED THE TRUTH ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING  169-215 (2010);  Aaron M. 
McCright & Riley E Dunlap, Anti-Reflexivity: The American Conservative Movement's Success in 
Undermining Climate Science and Policy,  27 THEORY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 1 (2010); STEPHEN H. 
SCHNEIDER, SCIENCE AS A CONTACT SPORT: INSIDE THE BATTLE TO SAVE THE EARTH‘S CLIMATE (2009); 
see also Naomi Oreskes,  Erik M. Conway, & Matthew Shindell, From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss: 
William Nierenberg, Global Warming, and the Social Deconstruction of Scientific Knowledge, 38 109 




Framing a regulatory choice as an expert rather than a social choice not only gives 
license to this particular kind of obstructionism, it also creates a high hurdle to 
participation by those less comfortable and familiar with expert discourse.  Language, 
education, and resource limitations can impede the ability to participate in administrative 
processes. The fact that these impediments are typically neither explicit nor legal barriers 
to participation does not resolve the problem. Regulators must confront the unfortunate 
reality that those facing the greatest barriers to participation are often those most likely to 
wind up bearing the greatest environmental burdens.
177
 When the available processes for 
public participation wind up effectively excluding the most vulnerable portions of the 
affected population, the decisionmaking process fails. Not only do the resulting gaps in 
information and perspective make it less likely that the regulatory decisions will protect 
all of society, but the process itself winds up undermining rather than enhancing public 
trust in the regulatory process. When they ignore the problem of differential access to 
participation mechanisms, regulators become vulnerable to the accusation that they are 
trying to pass an insider dialogue off as a genuine public discourse.
178
  Recognizing this 
as a problem can be the first step to revitalizing the laws that foster public participation in 
environmental decisionmaking.  In taking these steps, human rights norms can provide 
guidance.  Before exploring that guidance in detail, however, it is worth considering how 
a human-rights mediated move from an expert framing to a social decisionmaking 
framing can help regulators respond to the profound critique of existing regulatory 
decisionmaking leveled by the environmental justice movement.  
 
C.  The Challenge of Environmental Justice 
 
 Administrative agencies are mandated to protect all Americans, not just those who 
can afford lawyers, lobbyists and experts. Environmental justice advocates have long 
complained that existing United States environmental laws systematically fail to achieve 
their promise for discrete and predictable segments of society—namely poor 
communities of color.  These advocates make the case that poverty and pollution are 
inextricably and inappropriately linked.
179
 They point to the disproportionate siting of 
locally-undesirable land uses (LULUs), that typically come with a significant pollution 
load, in poor and minority communities,
180
 and the lack of access those same 
communities often have to greenspace, parks and other environmental amenities.
181
  
Thus, they advocate for examining regulatory decisionmaking through an environmental 
justice lens in order to break the existing association between race and environmental 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tobacco's Tactics to "Manufacture Uncertainty" on Climate Change (2007). 
177
 Bratspies, Regulatory Trust, supra n. __ at 621-22. 
178
 This is a criticism that has been leveled at MMS in its regulation of offshore drilling. See sources 
cited in ___ infra. 
179
 Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement 98-
100, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard, ed. 1993).  
180
 Id.  see also, Steve Lerner, DIAMOND: THE STRUGGLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN 
LOUISIANA‘S CHEMICAL CORRIDOR (2006)(giving the detailed story of one environmental justice 
community); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE CLASS AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 
(1990) (documenting environmental injustice) 
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 See e.g., Robert Garcia et al., Economic Stimulus, Green Space and Equal Justice: Policy Report 







  Among the most recent examples of this phenomenon are the allegations that 
the majority of wastes generated from the cleanup of BP‘s oil spill are being disposed of 
in communities of color.
183
 
 Environmental justice questions have been a focus on public attention for 
decades. The 1982 demonstrations against the siting of a hazardous waste landfill in 
predominantly African-American Warren county in North Carolina is typically identified 
as the birth of the environmental justice movement.
184





 began providing hard data for the contention that hazardous waste 
facilities and contaminated sites were disproportionately more likely to be located in 
minority communities. Based in part on these studies, EPA concluded that racial and 
ethnic minorities were disproportionately exposed to pollutants of all kinds and that 
African-American children had disproportionately high blood lead levels (which leads to 
an array of adverse health effects).
187
 At the same time, the National Law Journal found 
racial disparities in the enforcement of federal environmental laws.
188
 Recognizing the 
potential of these findings to undermine the legitimacy of the entire regulatory enterprise, 
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898.
189
 This order directed federal agencies 
to make environmental justice part of their mission.  
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WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2010) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081503185_2.html?sid=ST2010081503271; Daisy Hernandez, 
Here is Where BP is Dumping its Oil Spill Waste, COLORLINES (Aug. 4 2010) 
http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/08/heres_where_bp_is_dumping_its_oil_spill_waste.html 
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 LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE 
RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19 (2001) (also offering alternative starting points); 
Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizens Provisions Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to 
Environmental Justice,22 Ecology L. Q. 1, 9 (1995).  
185
 See U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their 
Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities, GAO/RCED-83-168 (1983). 
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 See United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Waste and Race in the United 
States: A National Report on the Racial and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communities with 
Hazardous Wastes Sites 9 (1987) (documenting that race was the most significant factor in determining the 
location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.) 
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 See Nat‘l Advisory Council for Envtl. Pol‘y & Tech., Report of the Title IV Implementation 
Advisory Committee: Next Steps for EPA, State and Local Environmental Justice Programs (1999); see 
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 The Obama administration has made environmental justice one of its 
environmental priorities.
190
 Guidance issued in July 2010 identified achieving 
environmental justice as an EPA priority, and directed that environmental justice be 
factored into every agency decision.
191
 Yet, as the concerns surrounding disposal of the 
BP oil spill waste demonstrate, actually transforming regulatory decisionmaking to better 
reflect the environmental justice principles of ―fair treatment and meaningful 
involvement‖
192
 is no easy task.  
 EPA‘s recent efforts to define and integrate environmental justice are an 
important step forward. Now, it, along with the other agencies of the federal government, 
needs to heed the GAO‘s repeated calls for measurable benchmarks for assessing 
progress toward environmental justice.
193
 In developing these benchmarks, the body of 
knowledge that has grown up around international human rights offers some useful 
guidance. The well-developed international procedures for prior informed consent, 
participation, access to information and transparency may be instructive as regulators 
grapple with how to internalize environmental justice.  In particular, these international 
norms can help regulators: clarify ambiguities in key statutory terms; identify appropriate 
affirmative steps to promote wider participation in regulatory decisionmaking; and offer 
models for analyzing environmental justice issues as part of routine agency processes.  In 
short, human rights norms can help regulators give existing regulatory processes a new 
normative gloss, one more likely to generate progress in responding to the thorny 
problem of delivering environmental justice.  
Starting from the principle that communities are entitled to participate fully and 
meaningfully in decisions affecting them, numerous laws require consultation and even 
local consent before certain activities can proceed. NEPA itself specifically states that its 
purpose is to ―insure that environmental information is available to public officials and 
citizens before decisions are made and before action is taken.‖194 Unfortunately, 
environmental justice has highlighted the widespread failure to realize this principle 
across a wide swath of regulatory decisionmaking.
195
 Indeed, there is often strong 
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 See e.g., General Accounting Office, Environmental Justice: General Accounting Office, 
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Problems (July 27, 2007) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071140t.pdf; General Accounting Office, EPA 
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 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NOT IN MY BACKYARD: EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 57, 84-87 (2003), 
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resistance to even recognizing that environmental inequities exist, or ought to be viewed 
as a problem of structural inequality in society. Changing things will be even more 
difficult.  
Full and meaningful participation involves access to decision making processes 
concerning the environment, and may require that regulators provide resources (such as 
expert assistance) needed to ensure a level playing field.  For example, in response to the 
BP oil spill, EPA‘s Department of Environmental Justice offered community grants for 
the purpose of facilitating meaningful involvement in the responses to the spill by 
developing information about, or capacity in, affected communities.
196
 
The Obama administration has expressed a commitment to transparency, marking a 
significant break from the prior Bush administration.
197
  However, these basic building 
blocks of regulatory trust are too important to be left to the vagaries of particular 
administrations. Incorporating human rights norms into the fabric of regulatory 
decisionmaking would depersonalize human rights compliance, thereby helping to ensure 
implementation regardless of who holds the White House and who is head of the agency. 
One thing a human rights framing for the EIS process might accomplish would be to 
help significantly expand participation in public decisionmaking, as well as transparency 
and access to information. Such a result would greatly enhance both the perceived 
legitimacy of the EIS process and its overall usefulness.
198
 Paying attention to the 
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ramifications of power and the exclusionary role that unmediated expert discourse often 
plays could make NEPA‘s EIS processes far more inclusive and rigorous. Such a 
decisionmaking process would ensure that regulators, the regulated community and the 
public beneficiaries of regulation shared an investment in regulatory policy, and would 




1. Participation   
  
Informed participation by citizens is the heart of much of modern environmental law 
in the United States. The ideal of a truly mutual learning process between government 
regulators, the regulated community and the beneficiaries of regulation is viewed as the 
best way to both recognize "the profound impact of man's [sic] activity on . . . the natural 
environment . . . ,"
200
 and to develop "a national policy which will encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man [sic] and his environment; [and] promote efforts 
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment ...."
201
 
 The most famous embodiment of this ideal is the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), the grand-daddy of all environmental statutes.  Enacted in 1969, NEPA 
mandates that the environmental consequences of government activities be given due 
consideration. To that end, NEPA requires that the government identify and consider the 
environmental consequences of its actions before making major decisions.
202
  This statute 
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 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 USC § 4321. To that end, NEPA explicitly commits the 
federal government to:  
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for 
succeeding generations;  
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing 
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 Specifically, NEPA requires that any federal agency contemplating a ―major 
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment‖ conduct an 
EIS in order to develop, assemble and analyze environmental information. 
204
 The EIS 
must set forth sufficient information for the general public to make an informed 
evaluation,
205
 and for the decisionmaker to ―consider fully the environmental factors 
involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the 
environment against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action.‖
206
 Indeed, the 
―heart of the environmental impact statement‖ is the analysis of alternatives to the 
proposed action that ―rigorously explore[s] and objectively evaluate[s] all reasonable 
alternatives, and alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study [along with a 
discussion of] the reasons for their having been eliminated.‖
207
  
 Although NEPA was explicitly intended to further substantive environmental 
goals, the EIS requirements it imposes on agencies have been interpreted as essentially 
procedural rather than substantive.
208
 Thus, the EIS does not mandate outcomes
209
 but 
instead acts to protect the integrity of agency decisionmaking by giving assurance that 
                                                                                                                                                 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
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151, 161 (1973) 
205
 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2d Cir.1973). 
206
 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir.1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1064 (1978). 
207
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comparative merits‖ Id. at § 1502.14(b). 
208
 See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980) (announcing 
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stubborn problems or serious criticisms have not been ―swept under the rug.‖
210
  As ―the 
outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during 
the planning stage of agency actions,‖
211




 To that end, NEPA commits "all agencies of the Federal Government" to the 
collection, use, and dissemination of information on the environment.
213
 Federal agencies 
must, of course "initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and 
development of resource-oriented projects."
214
 Those informational requirements do far 
more than just ensure that agencies are well informed. Federal agencies also have a 
positive obligation to "make advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and 
enhancing the quality of the environment" available to States, counties, municipalities, 
institutions, and individuals.
215
 One consequence of this requirement is that interested 
persons are entitled to access government information in order to facilitate their 
participation in this process. There is no doubt that NEPA was intended to provide 
detailed environmental information to the public to permit meaningful participation.
216
 
 Intended to build public trust in the legitimacy and appropriateness of the 
agency‘s ultimate decision, these procedural requirements make the agency identify and 
account for the environmental costs and benefits of the proposed action as part of the 
decisionmaking calculus. Although the agency has considerable discretion in balancing 
the competing values implicated in any decision, the EIS requirement shines the bright 
light of informed public scrutiny on that discretionary exercise of power. The assumption 
is that an appropriate level of substantive environmental protection will flow from the 
participatory and transparent agency decisionmaking process.   
 NEPA‘s overall environmental and administrative effectiveness has been subject 
to fierce debate. Some view the EIS requirement as a significant cause of regulatory 
ossification, while others claim it as the heart of successful environmental law.  
Regardless of which camp one finds more persuasive, there is no doubt that NEPA‘s 
procedural requirements have often acted as a significant check on agency actions. And 
NEPA has been the model for similar laws around the world.  
Yet, NEPA‘s current vision of access to information and public participation is 
triggered very late in the decisionmaking process. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
limited the ability of interested citizens to challenge their inability to participate in the 
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broader environmental planning processes,
217
 even though those early processes 
inevitably structure how the agency exercises its discretion in subsequent project 
applications.  Agencies are therefore free to proceed without public participation at these 
early stages of decisionmaking. However, agencies employing a human rights framing 
might decide that, regardless of whether participation at early junctures is required, that 
participation is valuable. After all, the Supreme Court‘s conclusion that citizens cannot 
demand the right to participate in early, agenda-setting agency decisions does not mean 
that agencies cannot elect to provide avenues for such participation. Lessons from the 
more expansive right to participate developed under international human rights law, and 
further refined in the Aarhus Convention might be valuable in helping agencies 
understand why earlier participation is critical to the vitality of environmental 
decisionmaking and how that participation might be structured. Acting on that 
appreciation, regulators could choose to make the earliest stages of regulatory 
decisionmaking more transparent, and could develop opportunities for participation all 
along the regulatory pathway.   
 
2. Transparency and Access to Information 
 
It was none other than Lewis Brandeis who wrote that ―sunlight is said to be the 
best of disinfectants.‖
218
 It is certainly not novel to propose transparency as a critical 
component of sound regulatory decisionmaking. Indeed, the core of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) consists of rules for public notice, participation, and comment.
219
 
The APA empowers citizens to interact with regulators through public meetings and 
written submissions. These participatory rights are of vital importance to the democratic 
legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking. United States disclosure statutes like the 
Freedom of Information Act
220
 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to 
Know Act
221
 have been influential around the world. For example, the ICJ recently 
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Taken together, these laws not only ―make[] environmental protection a part of 
the mandate of every federal agency and department;‖
223
 they also ―insure that 
environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions 
are made and before action is taken.‖
224
 While statutes focus on providing information, 
they leave the decision of how to use that information to individuals and the public as a 
whole. Thanks to former Vice-President Gore‘s Reinventing Government
225
 initiative, a 
significant proportion of United States‘ government information is readily available on 
the internet.
226
  Availability of this information for public assessment and comment is 
important.  
Unfortunately, these statutes too often fall short of creating genuine opportunities 
for public participation in the regulatory process.
227
 For example, NEPA has a very thin 
vision of public access to information. It posits an initial flow of information from the 
government to the public, and then a responsive flow from the public to the government.  
As such, it elides the role that power differentials play in making the NEPA process 
accessible to some but not others. For example, EISs typically involve an expert analytic 
framework that can erect high barriers to participating in the dialogue at all.
228
 Legitimate 
positions and voices not facile with, and thus unable to fit into the dominant discourse, 
are often excluded.
229
 Along the same lines, turf wars between professional subcultures 
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 For a summary of recent critiques of the state of transparency, see Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of 
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within an agency—say between lawyers and economists—can also create bureaucratic 
obstacles that hinder the effective incorporation of diverse perspectives in the 
decisionmaking process.  
Moreover, the access required by the APA and NEPA only applies once an 
agency has developed a proposed course of action.
230
 Citizens are routinely excluded 
from the earlier stages of the process—the forums in which substantive drafting decisions 
are made, agendas are set, and decisionmaking rules are established.
231
  To the extent that 
agencies get in the habit of adopting private industry standards as their regulatory 
standards, as the Mineral and Mining Service, for example, did more than 100 times in its 
regulation of offshore drilling, the perceptual and substantive problems associated with 
this exclusion is compounded. Industry gets two bites at the apple—first, in a closed and 
private process, industry develops its consensus standard, and then in the public 
rulemaking based on that standard, industry gets a chance to comment on the proposed 
agency action.  The beneficiaries of health and safety regulation, by contrast, are 
excluded from the private process by which industry develops its consensus standards, 
and only gets to participate once a notice of proposed rulemaking is published. Thus the 
public is, through no fault of its own, a ―Johnny come lately,‖—invited into the process 
only once an agency has largely committed itself to a particular course. Although an 
agency may modify a proposed action in light of public comments, those comments 
typically come too late in the process to be genuinely transformative.  When regulators 
have already mapped out and published their intended approach, investing time, energy 
and effort in its proposed action, it is very difficult to convince them to radically switch 
gears—particularly because the consequence of such a switch is that the rule will no 
longer be the ―logical outgrowth‖ of the proposed rule,
232
 thus mandating the 
commencement of a new rulemaking process.  It is therefore not surprising that regulators 
have not been successful in creating a more of an iterative process of mutual information 
sharing and priority identification with the general public.
233
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While the general public has had little opportunity to engage in reflexive 
rulemaking with agencies, regulators have had more success in creating these kinds of 
processes with regulated industry.
234
  When problems are ill-defined and possible 
alternatives are obscure and unknown, industry has been viewed as best positioned to 
contribute valuable information that will make better and more informed decisions 
possible.
 235
 An overly cozy relationship between regulators and regulatees can, and has, 
sometimes reduced these processes to mere paper pushing exercises.
236
  The most 
extreme result has been the tendency in some agencies simply to adopt industry 
consensus standards as the official regulatory standards.
237
 Such an approach does a 
disservice to the public both substantively and procedurally.  On a substantive basis, not 
only do industry standards fail to push the development of new technology in order to 
achieve for better environmental performance, they rarely even reflect the best practices 
currently available across the industry.
238
 As the National Commission on the BP 
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Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill recently noted, consensus standards are too often lowest-
common denominator standards.
239
 As a procedural matter, API‘s procedures for 
developing standards fall far short of existing federal standards,
240
 which are in turn, 
inadequate to ensure full transparency and participation. 
Further contributing to an unbalanced relationship between regulators, regulated 
communities and beneficiaries of regulation has been the way that the procedures 
enshrined in administrative decisionmaking welcome the public into an expert discourse. 
Because of the highly technical nature of many rulemakings, the opportunity to 
participate is effective only for those able to translate their concerns into language that 
resonates within that discourse. 
Human rights norms might help domestic regulators move beyond a minimalist 
conception of transparency as public access to government information, and broaden 
reflexive rulemaking beyond regulated industries. A robust conception of transparency 
must grapple not only with access to government information but also with the equally 
significant issues of how and whether information is communicated in a fashion that fully 
enables public participation,
241
 and who bears the costs associated with transparency. 
These latter questions are particularly important in the global warming context because, 
given the levels of uncertainty, the perceived legitimacy of any regulatory decision will 
be tied directly to the level of trust the public rests in the decisionmaker. Meeting this 
obligation more fully might sometimes entail simplifying and clarifying information to 
make it more accessible.  At other times, when information is simply too technical to be 
accessible to lay readers and the wider community, fulfilling this oblifation might mean 
providing the resources for interested groups to hire independent experts able to represent 
their interests in this process.
242
 A decade ago, EPA‘s Science Advisory Board concluded 
that when properly structured, the kind of enhanced participation that human rights law 
contemplates can result in high-quality scientific decisions.
243
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3. Prior Informed Consent 
 
  Along the same lines, embracing rigorous prior informed consent procedures 
might be a way to address the significant perceptual disconnect that often exists between 
those making regulatory decisions and those affected by the decisions.  In particular, 
there is often a profound distrust between the regulators and the intended beneficiaries of 
human health and environmental regulation. There is at least the perception that the 
regulators share the world views, interests and values of the regulated parties, rather than 
those of the regulation‘s intended beneficiaries. The so-called revolving door between 
industry and government is emblematic of this problem. Those selected to head 
regulatory agencies often come from the industries they regulate, and then return to those 
industries after leaving the government.  For example, President Bush appointed Philip 
A. Cooney of the American Petroleum Institute as chief of staff of the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality. After leaving that post after it was discovered that he 
had edited scientific reports in order to downplay evidence of climate change, Mr. 
Cooney went to work for Exxon Mobil.  Similarly, when David Lauriski became head of 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration, he promptly acted on a petition to water 
down worker protection regulations—a petition submitted by his former employer 
Energy West Mining Company. Upon leaving the government, Lauriski went to work for 
John T. Boyd Co., a mining consultancy. 
244
 Other examples abound.
245
  
One of the major criticisms leveled at the Mineral and Mining Service (MMS), 
even before the BP oil spill, was that of a revolving door between industry and the 
agency.
246
 A human rights-based approach to environmental regulation might have 
reshaped the regulatory prelude and response to the most significant United States 
environmental disaster—the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The NEPA requirement 
that the agency prepare an EIS before making a decision about leasing already serves a 
number of purposes related to those captured by emerging international environmental 
norms.  First, an EIS promotes transparency, by requiring the government to identify 
proposed actions and to solicit comments thereon.  Second, an EIS promotes participation 
by allowing all interested to comment.   
However, the EIS requirement would be enhanced if it were interpreted in concert 
with the emerging international environmental norm of prior informed consent and the 
right to environmental information. These norms embody a different and more robust 
concept of public participation than currently seen in United States law. They require the 
government to make this right concrete by actively soliciting participation from those 
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who might otherwise not participate in the decisionmaking process.
247
 If NEPA were 
interpreted along those lines, voices that typically do not get attention before post-
decisionmaking litigation, if indeed they are heard at all, would become an integral part 
of shaping the EIS inquiry itself. As a result, the government would hear a more diverse 
array of voices when they could do more good—when the government is deciding the 
scope of activity to investigate, rather than at a later litigation phase challenging a 
decision that is already a fait accompli.  In particular, embrace of the human rights 
concept of prior informed consent would give affected communities the sense that they 
had some control over their destiny. 
Overall, a human rights framing could help agencies facilitate wide-spread public 
participation, including those currently excluded, de facto if not de jure. Such a result 
would enhance the democratic legitimacy of regulatory decisionmaking under NEPA, 
and would also improve the quality of the actual decisions themselves.
248
 This kind of 
participatory process also supplies the requisite ―world in common‖ that sociological 
research tells us is necessary for trust.
249
 Because so much of the human rights discourse 
surrounding environmental rights focuses on participation and access to information, the 
NEPA EIS process
250
 is a place where learning from human rights norms might enrich 
the domestic regulatory process. 
Because it would give typically under-represented groups a clearly-defined role in the 
conduct of an environmental assessment, the human-rights enhanced EIS process 
described above would also help promote an additional emerging international norm—
intergenerational equity. Particularly where irreversible changes are contemplated, 
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intergenerational equity would put a thumb on the scale for precaution—for sustainably 
managing and preserving rather than overexploiting resources. EPA has already begun to 
embrace this concept, rejecting a narrow economic vision of social welfare that denies the 
obligation of intergenerational equity either because we cannot know future preferences 
or because future generations are presumed to be wealthier and therefore more able to 
absorb costs that present generations pass on to them.
251
 
In its December 2009 Endangerment Finding, EPA explicitly and repeatedly found 
that greenhouse gas emissions threatened the public health, and the public welfare of 
current and future generations.
252
 EPA defended its consideration of future harms and 
future generations as appropriate given the time scale of expected effects.
253
 In doing so, 
the agency harkened back to the earliest days of the Clean Air Act and to the judicial 
finding that the statute is precautionary in nature.
254
  This judicial finding built on the 
Congressional legislative history indicating that the Clean Air Act was intended to 
prevent harm before it occurred and was thus precautionary rather than reactive.   
This decision to include harms to future generations within the realm of issues to be 
considered in assessing endangerment is clearly not a wholesale endorsement of the 
internationally-developing notion of intergenerational equity. Nor is it at all comparable 
to the Philippine Supreme Court‘s endorsement of the rights of future generations in 
Oposa.  It is however, a beginning.  In making this finding, EPA has opened a dialogue 
that may lead to genuine regulatory consideration of questions of intergenerational 
equity.  In doing so, EPA acted solidly within the spirit of NEPA which states: 
 
it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of 
national policy, to [ensure] . . . that the Nation may . . . fulfill the 





Similarly, the National Park Service Act specifically identifies the preservation of 
national parks and monuments for future generations as the fundamental purpose for 
which the Park Service was founded.
256
 In addition, the Coastal Zone Management 
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 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
258
 also identify protecting future generations as 
part of their statutory purpose. 
Throughout its endangerment finding, EPA relied extensively on the work of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, particularly its 2007 Report.
259
 This resort 
to the accumulated wisdom of an internationally-constituted (albeit intergovernmental) 
organization may signal a broader willingness to engage with and draw on international 
sources. Thus, the twin decisions to predicate the Endangerment Finding in part on harms 
to future generations, and in part on the scientific work compiled by the IPCC may 
indicate a new path for regulatory decisionmaking in the climate change context. 
 
V. CONCLUDING NOTE 
 
What makes environmental regulation so difficult is not necessarily a lack of 
commitment to environmental goods, but rather competing visions of how to balance 
between these goods and other social priorities. Too often environmental concerns are 
pitted against powerful economic interests in a zero sum fashion. For example, despite 
the worst environmental disaster in United States history, unabashed and explicit 
concerns for the continued viability of the deepwater drilling industry animated the 
Hornbeck decision striking down the Department of Interior‘s decision to impose a 60 
day deepwater drilling moratorium.
 260 
This moratorium was explicitly for the purposes of 
allowing the agency to learn from the disaster about the needed safety and environmental 
changes that were necessary to protect the public.  
Because the regulatory prelude to the BP oil spill was also poorly managed,
261
 with 
inaccurate and incomplete NEPA documents rubber-stamped by the agency, and safety 
inspections allegedly completed by the company itself, it also raises the question of 
whether engagement with environmental human rights norms might have restrained the 
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government and encouraged it to more fully exercise the regulatory powers it already 
possessed.  
When a government does not care about the environment and bends existing law to 
avoid giving it force, can human right norms make a difference?  I think the answer is a 
resounding yes.  A government bent on violating human rights can certainly do so. But, 
the existence of a vibrant culture of human rights means that it can no longer do so with 
impunity.  If existing United States environmental regulatory processes had been imbued 
with more of a human rights sensibility it would have been much more difficult to play 
fast and loose with environmental requirements in the Gulf of Mexico. Because human 
rights discourse offers a well-institutionalized international regime,
262
 it offers an 
attractive vantage point from which to begin the culture shift that will make scenarios like 
the BP oil spill less likely.   
That said, the relationship between international law and domestic law is a fraught 
question in the United States.  Several Supreme Court justices
263
 and numerous elected 
representatives are on record for the proposition that resort to international law to 
understand United States law, particularly constitutional law, is inappropriate. In 2002, 
for example, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas admonished his fellow justices not 
to "impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."
264
  
The recent healthcare debate underscored the political tensions of looking outside our 
borders for regulatory models.
265
 This isolationist stance finds support in a popularly-held 
Panglossian vision of United States law as the best, truest and fairest of possible legal 
                                                 
262
 Regimes are typically defined as the principles, rules, norms and decisionmaking procedures around 
which expectations converge.  See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables, 36 Int‘l Org. 185 (1982); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A 
Regime Analysis, 40 Int‘l Org. 599, 602 (1986)(offering a slightly narrower definition of regimes as the 
norms and decisionmaking processes accepted by international actors to regulate an issue area.) 
263
 Justice Scalia in particular has expressed hostility to the use of foreign law. For example, in 2004, 
Justice Scalia told the American Society of International Law that "It is my view that modern foreign legal 
material can never be relevant to any interpretation of, that is to say, to the meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution.‖ Scalia Skeptical about International Law in US Courts, Marin Independent Journal (April 4, 
2004). available at: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1110916/posts.  Justice O‘Connor by 
contrast, stated that ―conclusions reached by other countries and the international community, although not 
formally binding on our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.‖ 
Remarks of Sandra Day O‘Connor, at the Southern Center for International Law (Oct. 28, 2003) available 
at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf.  She viewed this interchange, which she called 
―transjudicialism‖ as enriching United States law. Id.   
264
 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n. * (Oct. 21, 2002). 
265
 The so-called ―tea party‖ movement grew from opposition to congressional attempts to reform 
health care in the United States. Much of the rhetoric fueling this opposition was the accusation that health 
reform proposals were too influenced by approaches to health care in countries other than the United States.  
For a typical example of this rhetoric, see Intolerable Acts and Tea Parties (March 22, 2010) at  
http://fixhealthcarepolicy.com/tag/tea-party/.  Similarly, some prominent Republican political leaders have 
accused the administration of ―want[ing] to turn us into France.‖ See e.g. Evan Morris Santoro, McConnell, 
Cantor and Paul Warn GOPers at KY Breakfast: Democrats Will Destroy America, Talking Points Memo 
(Aug. 7, 2010) http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/08/paul-mcconnell-and-paul-warn-gopers-at-ky-
breakfast.php (quoting McConnell as saying ―We decided when they decided they were going to turn us 
into France, we were going to say no.") see also McConnell:  Dems will turn us into France, WASHINGTON 
TIMES (May 12, 2008) http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/may/12/mcconnell-dems-will-turn-us-
into-france/ .  Indeed a search for the phrase ―turn us into France‖ turned up more than 30,000 results 




systems.  The logical corollary of this belief is a disinclination to look elsewhere for 
guidance—if what exists here is already the ―best of all possible worlds‖ any resort to 
foreign or international law will degrade rather than enhance domestic legal processes.  
This nativist approach is dead wrong, both factually untrue (the United States has an 
impressive legal system to be sure, but it has many structural flaws in urgent need of 
remedy) and analytically unproductive. Time is too short, and the problems we face are 
too grave to allow parochial boosterism to continue to keep valuable tools and 
information out of the hands of those sworn to protect the public from harm.  We must be 
willing to both learn from the successes (and failures) of others, and allow them to learn 
from us in a similar fashion.  Looking to international human rights law for models and 
ideas will improve domestic regulation both by encouraging regulators to make giving 
real content to environmental statutes a central part of their mission, and by offering them 
tools by which to do this.  
To say this is not to deny that giving content to those rights remains an enormous 
challenge. Despite an impressive body of normative law, the on-the-ground, real world 
success in implementing the human rights norms that international law articulates is too 
often measured in inches. Progress is slow, even as environmental threats continue to 
mount. The identical, error-riddled spill prevention plans that the Mineral and Mining 
Service rubberstamped for BP and other drillers in the Gulf of Mexico provides a stark 
reminder that the laws are only as good as those charged with enforcing them.  Too often 
regulators have failed to implement key environmental laws like NEPA, and enforcement 
has been in half-measures. While the regulators sleep, environmental degradation and 
pollution continues largely unchecked.
266
  
 Regulators will need to sharpen their tools, and to wield them with vigor as they 
respond to climate change.
267
 If we do not take effective actions, and soon,
268
 the 
aggregate consequences of human activity may threaten the very existence of life on 
earth.
269
 For example, Dr. James E. Hansen, Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies, and NASA‘s top climate scientist, has stated: ―In my opinion there is no 
significant doubt (probability > 99%) that . . . additional global warming of 2 degrees 
Celsius would push the earth beyond the tipping point and cause dramatic climate 
impacts including eventual sea level rise of at least several meters, extermination of a 
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In the face of this impending catastrophe, the legal project seems stymied—with the 
international community unable even to negotiate an international successor agreement to 
the Kyoto Protocol,
271
 and the United States Senate abandoning attempts to pass climate 
change legislation.
272
  EPA is currently under siege
273
 for its attempt to step into the 
breach and to use its legal mandate under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide,
274
 
thereby making some small regulatory step toward preserving and protecting the earth‘s 
ecosystems. It is clear that their work would be further improved by invocation of human 
rights norms to inform these existing environmental decisionmaking processes. It is not 
clear, however, that such an invocation would support rather than undermine the agency‘s 
political position. It would indeed be unfortunate were parochial conceptions of law to 
keep useful tools out of the hands of regulators amidst a growing sense of environmental 
crisis.  Yet, the relationship between the legislature and regulators exercising delegated 
authority means that this vulnerability is an inherent aspect of choosing to focus on 
regulators as a locus of ―authoritative decision.‖ While there is much promise to pursuing 
that choice, the promise comes with short-term perils. 
Yet over time, I am convinced that reasonable minds will prevail, and the obvious 
utility of looking to international human rights to improve domestic environmental 
regulation will silence, if not convert, the nay-sayers.  The complex and ambiguous 
nature of the environmental challenges we face demands no less. Successfully responding 
to these challenges requires a dynamic balancing process capable of accounting for rapid 
technological change amidst conflicting national imperatives.  Using human rights norms 
to interpret existing statutory rights and regulatory responsibilities can help build a more 
vibrant and effective environmental regulatory regime, and we cannot afford not to take 
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advantage of that possibility. 
 
 
